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Commercial Common Law, the United
Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit
David Frisch·
This Article develops a model ofjudicial behavior that rests on the idea that a judge's
decision is a fanction of her attitudes and role orientations and these, in turn, are heavily
influenced by her law school education. The result is an intellectual stubbornness that may lead
judges to reject not only optional innovations that may present themselves, but may also cause
them to construe mandatory provisions as if no change had occurred. This model and the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods illustrate situations in which the emerging
international commercial code may play an important role in the development ofdamestic law.
Although it has been accepted that international instruments have the potential to help shape
the law on a damestic level, this phenomenon has only been discussed in the context of
legislation. However, these instruments may also exert an influence on the behavior ofjudges
greater than is commonly supposed. For it is surely the case that, in creating a new legal
environment for decision making, international instruments are bound to mediate existing
intellectual habits and encourage experimentation and growth in cases withaut an international
character. An effort to ensure a clear understanding ofthis sort would count as one among a
wide range ofsteps to build a framework within which international law can develop without
unexpectedly disturbing the damestic legal system.

I.

THE CASE AGAINST TIIE CISG AS A MODEL FOR

503
A. Differences in Background Law ........................................ 507
B. Differences in Scope........................................................... 509
C. Differences in Substance .................................................... 513
II. THE RELEVANCE OF HABIT IN SHAPING JUDICIAL
OUTCOMES .................................................................................. 517
A. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co................................. 524
B. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American
National Bank .................................................................... 529
C. Diefenbach v. Gomey ........................................................ 535
III. THE RELEVANCE OF TIIE CISG TO TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOMESTIC LAW •••••••.••••••.•.•.••••••.•••••.•.•.•••••.••.•••.•.•..•.•••.•.••••.•.••••.• 540
A. The Expanded Availability ofSpecific Relief ................... 541
LEGISLATIVEREFORM .••••.•.•.•••.••...•••••.•.•.•••••.••••••.•••.•••.•.••.•••.•...••

* Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law;
Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.S. University of Pennsylvania; J.D.
University of Miami School of Law; LL.M. Yale Law School. I am indebted to my research
assistant at the University of Illinois College of Law, Lauren R Frank, for valuable
contributions to this Article.
495

TULANE LAW REVIEW

496

[Vol. 74:495

B.
C.

An Expanded Right ofReclamation .................................. 547
The Nachfrist Procedure .................................................... 553
N. CONCLUSION ..............•.•...•.....••.•...•.•....•••.•.•........••••..•....•...••••..... 559
Taught law is tough law. 1
Codification, particularly since the formulation of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) and its enactment throughout
the United States,2 has increasingly become the preferred method of
shaping the development of commercial law.3 Aside from the process
of periodic adjustments in existing UCC articles to reflect deepgoing
changes in society,4 there have been several instances where
supplementary articles have been enacted as formal amendments to the
Code.5 For example, computers, reader-sorter machines, image
processors, and other technological advances have given rise to new
paperless systems of high-value wire credit transfers. 6 One possible
1.
See FREDERIC WU.LIAM MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 25
(1901).
2.
After the Code's initial adoption by Pennsylvania in 1953, nationwide enactment
was temporarily halted when it was criticized by the New York Law Revision Commission
and temporarily rejected by that state. See Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial
Code, in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 1, 5-6 (American Bar Ass'n 1964). It was
not until the 1957 Official Text of the Code was enacted by Massachusetts that its prospects
brightened. See id. at 7-8. Today the Code, in one form or another, is the law in all 50 states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
3.
To be sure, this is not an altogether new phenomenon. The Code supplanted
uniform acts that were drafted and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) over the course of half a century, including the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. See U.C.C. general cmt. {1998).
4.
Within the past decade, the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALI) have
revised articles 3 (1990), 4 (1990), 5 (1995), 6 (1989), 8 (1994), and 9 (1998). See U.C.C.
preface (1998). Drafting committees are currently revising articles 1, 2, and 2A. Although
the particular impetus for each revision project has been somewhat different, the basic
objective has always been to prevent the Code from becoming outdated. For example, since
the promulgation of the 1957 Official Text of the Code, article 2 (Sales) has remained
virtually unchanged. The same cannot be said, however, of commercial and consumer law
generally and the technological environment in which many transactions now take place.
Some of the more obvious changes include the common-law development of a theory of
strict products liability that overlaps the Code, the enactment of a ''hodgepodge of [federal
and state] consumer protection legislation," and the growing use of electronic methods of
contracting. Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect
Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARsHALL L.
REv. 39, 78 (1996). When one also considers the vast number ofjudicial opinions that have
revealed weaknesses in the current statutory structure, it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that article 2 may be in need of revision.
5.
See, e.g., U.C.C. arts. 2A, 4A (1998).
6.
See id. art. 4A prefatory note.
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response to this development might be to leave the task of making
"law'' to the marketplace, specifically to the financial players that
currently rely on this type of payment system, and to a slowly
developing common law.7 fustead, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American
Law fustitute (ALI) added a new article 4A to the Code in order to
respond to uneven or unwelcome common law developments. 8 The
NCCUSL and the ALI believed that courts were uncertain as to
whether analogies to other payment mechanisms such as negotiable
instruments could be appropriately employed to determine the
outcome of a funds transfer case. ''The result is a great deal of
uncertainty. There is no consensus about the juridical nature of a wire
transfer and consequently of the rights and obligations that are
created.'>9
In addition to these efforts to keep the Code responsive to
contemporary needs, legislatures have also reacted to change by
enacting auxiliary statutes covering only limited subjects that are not
consolidated into the Code. In 1996, for example, recognizing that
electronic commerce can be improperly impeded by inappropriate law
and that the impact of new technologies extends beyond the scope of
the Code to other types of transactions, the NCCUSL established the
Drafting Committee on Electronic Communications in Contractual
Transactions, later renamed the Drafting Committee on the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). The original charge to this
committee was ''to draft such revisions to general contract law as are
The dollar volume of payments made by wire transfer far exceeds the dollar
volume of payments made by other means. The volume of payments by wire
transfer over the two principal wire payment systems-the Federal Reserve wire
transfer network (Fedwire) and the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments
Systems (CHIPS}-exceeds one trillion dollars per day.

Id.
7.
It has been suggested that ''there is no real jurisprudence of wire transfer law."
Raj Bhala, 17ze Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 349 (1993). If
Professor Bhala is correct, might it not be preferable to permit a common-law jurisprudence
to develop than to draft a statute before the subject matter has attained a sufficient antecedent
conceptual formulation and integration?
8.
For example, the article 4A drafting committee took issue with leading cases
such as Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955-59 (7th Cir. 1982), which held
that consequential damages could be awarded if a bank, with notice of particular
circumstances giving rise to damages, refuses to execute a payment order. The result is a
statutory provision that bars consequential damages unless the bank expressly assumes, in
writing, such liability. See U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmt. 2 (1998). The first of these "new" articles
added to the Code was article 2A. This article governs personal property leases and was
initially approved by the NCCUSL and the ALI in 1987. It was subsequently amended in
1990 and is being revised again to bring it into conformity with the revisions to article 2.
9.
U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1998).
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necessary or desirable to support transaction processes utilizing
existing and future electronic or computerized technologies."10 The
committee completed its work in 1999. This project represents
another example of codification of a commercial law subject for which
no previously developed body of clear concepts exists. 11
Looking to international developments, a strong movement has
developed during the latter half of the twentieth century favoring the
worldwide unification and hannonization of commercial law. There
are essentially three principal methods by which this goal is being
accomplished. First, a measure of such hannonization can be, and has
been, brought about by private endeavor. The latest version of the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP)
prepared by the futemational Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1993 is
an example of this category. 12 This expression of private commercial
norms can become effective as the "law'' governing a letter of credit
transaction only if viewed as a binding source of trade usage or if
"incorporated in~o the text of the Credit."13
10. Memorandum from the Drafting Committee for Electronic Communications in
Contractual Transactions, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to
Scope and Program Committee (Jan. 3, 1997) (as approved by the Scope and Program
Committee and the Executive Committee of the Conference) (on file with author).
11. Another recent effort to statutorily preempt burgeoning case law is the aborted
project to draft a new article 2B of the Code. This article would have governed all contracts
for the sale, licensing, development, distribution, maintenance, documentation, and support
of computer software. fustead of incorporating this uniform law within the Code as
originally planned, the NCCUSL recently decided that it would be more appropriate to
promulgate the rules for adoption by the states as the Uniform Computer fuformation
Transactions Act (UCITA). For a brief history of article 2B and the reasons why the project
was transformed into the UCITA, see Fred H. Miller & Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B s New
Unifonn: A Free-Standing Computer Infonnation Transactions Act, UCC BULL., June 1999,
at 1, 2-4. See also National Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Committee
Drafting New Article 2B of Unifonn Commercial Code Makes Major Changes to Protect
Consumers and Small Businesses, and to Safeguard Public Interests in Free Speech and Fair
Criticism in the Electronic Age (Nov. 17, 1998) (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.2bguide.com/docs/prsrl 198.html> (press release) ("Article 2B can be a strong
first step toward a common legal framework for digital information and software licenses.");
infra text accompanying notes 68-73. Not everyone, however, shares the NCCUSL's
optimism. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep, INDUSTRY STANDARD, para. 2 (Nov.
20, 1998) <http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,2583,00.html> (''The current
draft represents little more than the narrow commercial interests of the major software
companies. It's an embarrassment to its sponsors, who ought to dump the draft and leave the
topic alone.").
12. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 500, ICC UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) [hereinafter UCP 500]. This
revised a prior version published in 1983. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, PuB. No. 511, DOCUMENTARY CR.Enrrs: UCP 500 AND 400 COMPARED (Charles
de! Busto ed., 1993).
13. UCP 500, supra note 12, art. 1.
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The Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UNIDROIT Principles or the Principles), drafted by the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 1994,
exemplifies the second method. 14 The Principles do not have the
binding effect of national legislation or an international convention but
rather are the equivalent of an "international restatement'' of the law of
contracts. 15 In this sense, the Principles become applicable ''when the
parties have agreed that their contract [shall] be governed by them"
and "may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law
instruments."16
Finally, cooperative measures on the governmental or legislative
level are achieving international harmonization in several important
areas of commercial law. This is creating what might be called an
international UCC17 covering such matters as the international sale of
goods; 18 international financial leasing; 19 international factoring; 20
international bills of exchange and promissory notes;21 and
international credit transfers, including electronic funds transfers,22

14. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization founded in 1926
and headquartered in Rome. For an overview of UNIDROIT's activities, see Mario
Matteucci, UNIDROJT: The First Fifty Years, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW xvii, xvii-xviii (1977).
15. See Ole Lando, European Contract Law, in INTERNATIONAL CoNTRACTS AND
CoNFLicrs OF LAWS: A COLLECTION OF EssAYS 1, 7-9 (Petar Sarl!evic ed., 1990) (stating that
the goal of the UNIDROIT project is to ''provide non-binding proposals for rules" and to
''prepare a systematic harmonization of the law of contracts'').
16. INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR TIIE UNIFICATION OF PRIVA1E LAW, PRINCIPLES OF INT'L
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS pmbl. (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1067, 1069 (1995).
17. See Amelia H. Boss & Patricia B. Fry, Divergent or Parallel Tracks:
International and Domestic Codification of Commercial Law, 47 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1506
(1992) ("[A]ctivities are currently under way on the international level leading to the creation
of what might be called an 'International Uniform Commercial Code."').
18. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG].
19. See Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring and International Financial Leasing, May
28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 927 (1988).
20. Seeid.
21. See Convention on International Bills ofExchange and International Promissory
Notes, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 6th Comm., 21st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/43/820 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 170 (1989).
22. See Report ofthe United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work of its Twenty-Fifth Session, 4-22 May 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/47117 (1992), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 587 (1993).
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independent bank guarantees, and letters of creclit.23 Regional efforts
to unify commercial law are also becoming commonplace.24
What should the Code drafters do about this international
commercial lawmaking activity? Although one of the principal
underlying purposes and policies of the Code is ''to ·make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions,"25 national uniformity of
commercial law should be viewed in relation to the ultimate goal of
international harmonization of conflicting laws. Such harmonization
would help surmount what has been defined as the "anarchy'' upon
which international relationships are based.26 In other words, one of
the greatest impediments to worldwide trade is the impact of a myriad
of distinct domestic laws. Indeed, commentators have suggested that
the sponsors of the Code pay attention to the international
ramifications of the Code and the need for uniformity between
domestic and international law.27 On the other hand, it must be
recognized that· the attainment of national uniformity, by itself, will
make commercial law more easily accessible and may facilitate future
attempts at harmonization by the various international law making
bodies.28
Concern and debate over the extent to which commercial law on
one level (international or domestic) should be taken into account in
revisions of the law on the other level have, to date, been limited to the
various "legislative" drafting projects that were recently completed or
are presently under way.29 This conversation misleads us to think that
23. See Report ofthe United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the
Work ofIts Twenty-Eighth Session, 4-26 May 1995, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 17,
Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/50/17 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Harold S. Burman, International Conflict of Laws, the 1994 InterAmerican Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, and Trends for the
1990s, 28 VAND. J. 'fRANSNAT'LL. 367, 386 (1995).
25. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1998).
26. See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSI'EMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY 9 (2d ed. 1978).
27. See, e.g., Boss & Fry, supra note 17, at 1506-07; James E. Byrne, Fundamental
Issues in the Unification and Harmonization ofLetter of Credit Law, 37 LOY. L. REv. 1, 1-6
(1991); Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C.
Article 2 in Light ofthe' United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LoY. L. REv. 43, 43-45 (1991).
28. For example, it has been suggested that in the area of secured financing ''the
impact of United States developments on the international level should be significant."
Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between International
and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1931, 1942 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability ofthe United Nations Convention
on the International Sale ofGoods as a Model for the Revision ofArticle Two ofthe Uniform
Commercial Code, 72 TuL. L. REY. 1995 (1998); Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC
Article 2, Sales in Light ofthe United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165 (1995); Peter Wmship, The National
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drafting convergence is the only issue of true importance. There is
little dispute that the quickest and most efficient route to unification
and harmonization is for drafting committees to coordinate
international and domestic law; it simply cannot make sense in today's
global economic environment to allow important legal outcomes to
tum on national legislation so diverse that intelligent business planning
becomes impossible.
Neglected by writers, however, is another source of law in the
United States-common law-that has the potential to assist the
harmonization effort and which itself might be strengthened and
improved by drawing upon the emerging law of international
commercial transactions.
In the current age of codification,
commercial common law has become only a small part of the
sprawling, complex body of commercial law, but it is an important
part, both practically and conceptually. Practically, common law rules
are important because, unless displaced by the Code, they supplement
its provisions.3° Conceptually, the common law, to the extent it is
reflective of the lex mercatoria, takes us close to the heart of what the
Code is all about, and this in tum invites us to examine basic models
of contract and property obligations.31
This Article examines the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG or the
Convention), which is arguably the greatest legislative achievement
aimed at harmonizing the international law of sales, from the
perspective of common-law decision making and attempts to discover
what implications, if any, the Convention might have on fundamental
questions concerning judicial adherence to precedent and the role of
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the International Unification of
Private Law, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 227 (1992).
30. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1998).
31. It has always been understood that
[c]ommercial law in the United States relies on the "law merchant" [See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 1-103.] The classic work on the law merchant, Lex Mercatoria,

makes the point that this body of authority is not one created by judges, but by the
customs of merchants. Of course, by the late 1600s the common law lawyers and
judges had assumed roles which previously had been performed by merchants, and
the courts themselves declared the custom, which was incorporated as a part of the
common law. Thus was commercial custom translated into judicial precedent, and
commercial law, informed by commercial custom, grew as case law. Unity oflaw
and custom has been a goal of commercial law ever since.
Miller & Ring, supra note 11, at 2. Karl Llewellyn, in defense of the Code, stated that it
seeks ''to remake the sales law of New York ... in order that the law may be made to
conform to commercial practice, and may be read and make sense." I STATE OF NEW YORK,
REPOKf OF THE LAW REVISION COMMITTEE FOR 1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 113 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 NEW YORK COMMITTEE REPORT].
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courts in the evolution of commercial law.32 More specifically,
commercial law Gudicially based or- statutory) should rest on a set of
real-world practices and expectations. When these expectations and
practices change, there should be a careful reworking and
modernization of traditional and archaic legal concepts. Once the
relationship between changing commercial practices and the
development of the law is understood, judicial legislation can be
shown to pose no significant challenge to the general legitimacy and
meaningfulness of the doctrine of stare decisis.33
Part I briefly reviews the basic arguments against using the CISG
as a model for the revision of article 2 of the Code. These arguments
are evaluated to detennine if they would also caution against courts
drawing on the CISG in formulating common-law rules. The analysis
seeks to show that the CISG should not be viewed as an inherently
hostile influence on courts deciding domestic cases.
Part II explains that the law-as originally taught to and learned
by judges-creates habits of thought not easily broken. These habits
are not troublesome merely because they significantly influence the
process by which principles and policies are fashioned into standards
of decision; rather, habits can force courts to act as guardians of a past
that may no longer be relevant.34 Accordingly, courts cannot be relied
upon to carefully develop incremental solutions to important problems
and to effectuate legislative will. Eventually, however, legislative
changes will be able to exert a meaningful influence on even the most
intellectually stubborn judge, and new habits will develop.
The remainder of Part II seeks to discover the force of habit in
three Code cases. The concern is not whether the particular decision is
normatively correct. The cases are used to demonstrate an approach
that contributes to, and is inherent in, the judicial process.

32. For a brief overview of the drafting history of the CISG, see infra note 35 and
accompanying text. Although the discussion centers around the CISG, it applies with equal
force to any international instrument. The CISG was chosen because it covers a wide and
important area of the law and represents a major step towards international uniformity of
commercial law. Moreover, sales law is an especially timely topic in light of the fact that the
twelve-year project to revise article 2 of the DCC is likely to continue for at least one more
year.
33. For a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, see infra notes 120-129 and
accompanying text.
34. It is not suggested here that this feature of the common-law system is always a
bad thing. To the contrary, by promoting stability, a historically oriented system of decision
making protects from abrupt defeat expectations invited by existing commercial
arrangements. The point is that we pay a price for that stability. When so employed, it slows
or halts the prudent reformulation of doctrine.

1999]

INERTIA OF HABIT

503

Finally, Part III suggests that by creating a new legal enviromnent
for decision making, the CISG may mediate habits of thought and
profoundly affect the course of domestic law. This Part looks at
several provisions of the CISG and speculates which are most likely to
influence the future shape of commercial law.
I.

THE CASE AGAINST THE CISG AS AMODEL FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM

The CISG represents the culmination of more than two
generations of international negotiation and received unanimous
approval by delegations representing sixty-two national legal systems
at a diplomatic conference convened by the United Nations General
Assembly in Vienna in 1980.35 Since its adoption, the CISG has been
ratified (or acceded to) by a total of fifty-seven countries, including the
three NAFTA trading partners.36 The CISG contains a comprehensive
set of rules governing the formation, performance, and remedies for
breach of contracts within its jurisdictional scope. Unless otherwise
agreed, the CISG applies to "contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States ... when the States are
Contracting States."37 Since the CISG has the preemptive force of
federal law, it will preempt article 2 when applicable, but otherwise
article 2 will continue to operate unfettered by the operative principles
and rules that apply to actions brought under the Convention. Thus,
buyers and sellers in the United States are faced with two uniform

35. Efforts to draft a generally acceptable uniform law on international sales had been
under way for over 50 years. UNIDROIT began the process in 1930 when it undertook to
draft a uniform law on international sales. Draft laws were considered at diplomatic
conferences held at the Hague in 1951 and 1964. See M.J. Bonell, Introduction to the
Convention, in CoMMENTARY ON TIIB INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CoNVENTION 3-7 (M.J. Bonell ed., 1987). These conferences produced two conventions, the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See id. at 4. These two conventions were
largely unsuccessful and what followed was a 1978 convention held by UNCITRAL and the
1980 convention in Vienna For a good historical introduction to the CISG, see Franco
Ferrari, Unifonn Interpretation ofthe 1980 Unifonn Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
183, 189-95 (1994).
36. The United Nations maintains a website for up-to-date information on the current
state of ratifications. See United Nations Treaty Series (visited Nov. 14, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/Deptslfreaty/collectionlseries/search.htrn>.
37. CISG, supra note 18, art l(l)(a). The CISG also applies ''when the rules of
private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State." Id. art
l(l)(b). Because the United States did not adopt article l(l)(b) (as allowed under article 95),
the CISG will not apply to American sales contracts when international private law leads to
the application of a contracting country's own law.
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legal texts, one for domestic and the other for international contracts
for the sale of goods.
It is tempting to say that the CISG is the international equivalent
of UCC article 2. Yet, despite some similarities, the CISG does not
necessarily resemble current article 2 in either scope or substance.38
Roughly, the question is to what extent the CISG should serve as a
model for revising article 2. There are certainly reasons to look
beyond uniformity among the states or among nations and strive for
uniformity between domestic and international law.39 fu a discussion
of this issue, Professor Richard E. Speidel, the former Reporter for the
article 2 drafting committee, observed that in today's world of
centralized and interdependent markets "a dualism between domestic
and international sales law seems arbitrary, if not quaint and archaic.•'4°
He offers the following hypothetical:
Suppose a Canadian seller, whose sole place of business is in Canada,
manufactures goods for export to the United States and to Mexico. The
product is advertised in both countries. The goods are sold and shipped
to a distributor in New York whose sole place of business is in the
United States and who then resells to buyers in either Mexico or the
United States. Suppose, :finther, that a resale buyer claims that the
goods do not conform to its expectations of quality and that commercial
loss has resulted. There is no damage to property or injury to person.41

Consideration of the possible lawsuits and the likelihood that the
applicable substantive law will not be the same forces the conclusion
38. For example, in terms of scope, the CISG expressly excludes from its coverage
consumer sales (unless the seller neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
purchased for consumer use) and also excludes sales of ships, aircraft, and electricity. See id.
art. 2. The Code has no such exclusions. In terms of substance, such doctrines as
"Nachfrist," see infra note 302 and accompanying text, and ''Price Reduction," see CISG,
supra note 18, art. 50, are foreign to the Code.
39. See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 29, at 170. Professor Speidel posits:
Although CISG and Article 2 operate in separate spheres, the transactions
governed do not observe the sometimes arbitrary jurisdictional lines between
domestic and international law. For example, uniformity would eliminate
uncertainty and surprise over the scope of state (UCC) and federal (CISG) sales
law and avoid disruptions in transactions that originate as domestic sales and
conclude, through export, as international sales. This is particularly true where
disputes over the quality of the goods are directly involved. Since this importexport transaction pattern is a reality in international sales, a sharp line between
domestic and international sales law seems contrived.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 171.
41. Id. at 178-79 (footnote omitted). The reason for the commercial loss limitation is
that the CISG does not address that aspect of products liability that pertains to death or
personal injury. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 5. Damage caused by the goods to other
property is, however, within the scope of the Convention. See id. arts. 1-6.
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that vertical uniformity, at least in this context, is highly desirable. If
the claimant is the New York distributor who sues the Canadian seller,
the CISG applies.42 Suppose that a Mexican resale buyer sues the
New York distributor and the Canadian seller. The resale buyer has no
claim under the CISG against the Canadian seller,43 but does have a
CISG claim against the New York distributor.44 Finally, assume the
claimant is a United States resale buyer who sues both the New York
distributor and the Canadian seller. In this case, the UCC governs the
suit between the two United States parties, and private international
law rules will dictate what law (UCC or Canadian law) will be used to
resolve the dispute with the Canadian seller.45
If all of this seems confusing, it is. Far from simply being an
interesting theoretical exercise, the choice between the CISG and the
UCC may be outcome-determinative.46 The result is pervasive
uncertainty in the contracting process, and the market effect of
uncertainty is inefficiency. For example, the Canadian seller in the
foregoing hypothetical simply does not know in advance what law will
govern if the goods tum out to be defective. Lacking necessary
information, it cannot be certain what its potential liability would be.
This makes it difficult to shape each transaction so that the burdens
and risks are allocated in an acceptable manner. Moreover, the fact
that the buyer's expectation of quality derived from the seller's express
or implied representations has greater protection under article 2 than
under the CISG may have disastrous consequences for an intermediate
seller in the position of the New York distributor. Assuming that it is
liable to a United States buyer for breach of warranty, it may be

42. See CISG, supra note 18, art. l(l)(a).
43. The CISG does not speak directly to the issue of privity of contract. It does,
however, provide that the Convention "governs only the formation of the contract of sale and
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract." Id. art. 4.
Moreover, article 35(1) limits quality disputes to what the contract requires. This language
strongly suggests that the CISG applies only to the two-person sale between commercial
parties. Assuming that a court would be unwilling to read the terms "seller," "buyer," and
"contract'' broadly so as to bring these remote sale cases within the scope of the Convention,
is the Mexican buyer without a remedy against the Canadian seller? Presumably, the
outcome depends on the applicability of the domestic sales law made relevant by choice of
law rules. If the UCC were applicable, the seller's liability would ultimately depend on
whether the resale buyer is able to recover on a direct warranty theory (recall that the goods
were advertised in Mexico) under UCC section 2-313 or as a third-party beneficiary under
UCC section 2-318.
44. See id. art. l(l)(a).
45. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
46. See Speidel, supra note 29, at 181-86.
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surprised to learn that it is unable to pass that liability upstream to its
seller.47
For legal scholars concerned about reducing transaction costs for
transnational trade and for the article 2 drafting committee, the
question is where to go from here. Answers diverge shaiply. All
acknowledge, to some extent, the importance of harmonizing domestic
and international laws. Some, however, argue that the CISG is an
inappropriate model for revised article 2,48 while others contend that,
although it is unlikely that the committee would adopt the CISG with
little or no change, there should be some strategy for coordination that
would identify those CISG provisions that should be incorporated into
the Code.49 Notwithstanding the perceived benefits of harmonization,
the drafting committee has largely ignored the CISG.50 As Professor
Speidel states, "[T]he process of harmonization to date has been ad
hoc and reflects highly selective borrowing."51
Now consider some of the factors that support the drafting
committee's position not to fully embrace the CISG and whether these
same factors suggest that courts, too, should be immune from the
adoption of international perspectives or approaches. Each of these
factors is multifaceted and cannot be fully explored here. The
47. For example, the CISG and article 2 seemingly agree on the treatment of the socalled implied warranties. Without saying so, the standards of quality in article 35(2) of the
CISG closely track the UCC's implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315 (1998). The track is not completely parallel,
however, because under article 2 goods that are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used" may still not ''pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description." Id. § 2-314(2). Thus, when the implied warranty is made, the scope of
merchantability protection is somewhat higher under article 2 than under the CISG. It is
therefore possible for the New York distributor to breach this warranty when it sells in a
Code-governed transaction but have no claim against its seller in a CISG-govemed
transaction.
48. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 29, at2001-13; Speidel, supra note 29, at 171-78.
49. See Winship, supra note 27, at 50. Winship suggests that the committee "might
identify (I) issues so important that differences between the two laws should be justified;
(2) issues so relatively unimportant that there is no reason for differences even in language;
and (3) devices to ensure that sellers and buyers know how the two laws complement each
other." Id. at48.
50. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons given by the Permanent Editorial
Board Study Committee for revising article 2 was the existence of "competing and better
solutions to sales problems" in the CISG. PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 2 Executive Summary, in 46 Bus. LAW. 1869, 1871 (1991). It is also worth noting
that Finland and Sweden revised their domestic sales laws in light of the Convention. See
Winship, supra note 27, at 46 n.13.
51. Speidel, supra note 29, at 169. For example, the drafting committee had the
CISG in mind when it decided to delete the definitions of delivery terms in Part 3 of the
current Code, see U.C.C. § 2-319 (Interim Draft Nov. 1999), and expanded the seller's right
to "cure" a nonconforming tender, see id. § 2-508.
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discussion is confined to those aspects on which commentators
generally agree.

A.

Differences in Background Law

One argument against the wholesale adoption of the CISG is that
there is no established fit between it and the well-established principles
of the common law of contracts. si Article 2, in contrast, was drafted as
part of a comprehensive commercial law system consisting not only of
the various sections within an article and the several articles but also of
domestic common law and statutes external to the Code.s3 Seen this
way, commercial law has, or should have, certain characteristics of
orderliness, systematic and interrelated rules, and a precise, consistent
terminology that gives it a rational structure. It is for this reason that
the drafters of the Code were comfortable leaving gaps in article 2 to
be filled by a considerable body of case law.s4 The chief concern is
that because the CISG was not drafted with any particular legal system
in mind, there will be no reliable source of gap fillers.ss Thus, the
advantages of clarity and certainty, superior accessibility, and the

52. See Gabriel, supra note 29, at 2003-04; Speidel, supra note 29, at 171-72.
Actually, the argument is broader. In addition to maintaining a fit between article 2 and the
common law, commentators have pointed out that article 2 is a component part of a
commercial code in which there is a consistency of definitions and policies. See Gabriel,
supra note 29, at 2004-05; Speidel, supra note 29, at 172.
53. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1998). The fact that each article of the Code is part of a
much larger system means that today's drafters must view their task (at least in part) as
making sure that the topics dealt with in the Code fit together in a logical way. This requires
not only that the sections in each article be compatJ.'ble, but additionally, that there be a
systematic tying together of the several articles. Moreover, the ability to recommend
particular decisions will depend on the drafting committee's insight into the location of the
doctrine in question within the entire commercial world order. I have argued that several
decisions of the drafting committee are inexplicable in terms of policy and fail to
accommodate essential policies expressed elsewhere in the Code and, in some cases, in the
law outside of the Code. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification as
Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVISL. REv. 17, 28-44 (1998).
54. Section 1-103 of the Code sanctions the use of non-Code principles of law and
equity. It provides, ''Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy,
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
However, determining when the Code has displaced a particular non-Code rule is no easy
matter. See David Frisch, Buyers Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: 11ze Cose for
Mistake and the Jndeterminancy of U.C.C. Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. REv. 291, 333-43
(1990).
55. The CISG provides that gaps in coverage are to be filled first by internal analogy
when the CISG contains an applicable general principle and, in the absence of a guiding
principle, by reference to the rules of private international law. See CISG, supra note 18, art.
7(2).
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economy of the common law as a source of fallback principles are
lost.
AE an illustration of the mesh between article 2 and non-Code
law,56 consider the simple contract formation issue of when a mailed
acceptance takes effect. On this point the Code is silent-but not the
common law. Every first-year law student learns that a mailed
acceptance is effective to make a contract when and where mailed, i.e.,
the "mailbox" rule. 57 By virtue of UCC section 1-103, this rule
supplements the Code and it was, therefore, unnecessary for the
drafters of article 2 to include such a provision. They knew what they
were getting when they chose this course. But suppose that a context
develops in which there are conflicting common law rules stated in
different opinions. For example, what if there ceased to be a single,
invariant, and comprehensive statement of the mailbox rule? In such a
case, legislative silence may no longer be the appropriate response.
This ambiguity is exactly what has happened in the area of
electronic contracting. Reacting to case law58 and the perception that
electronic communication is more akin to a face-to-face conversation
56. From the inception of the article 2 drafting project, attention has been paid to the
common law.
In 1987, Professors Speidel and Mooney submitted an influential
memorandum to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. See
Richard E. Speidel & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Proposal for a Preliminary Study on a Possible
Project for the Revision of Article 2, UCC (1987) in THE EMERGING NEW UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 409 (1989). The memorandum's stated purposes were ''to identify
various areas of inquiry for the proposed Preliminary Study on the Revision ofU.C.C. Article
2," and to "provide a useful agenda for the work of an Article 2 study group." Id. This
memorandum was probably instrumental in the Permanent Editorial Board's decision to
conduct a formal study. Referring to the potential tension between the general theory of
contract in the Second Restatement of Contracts and article 2, the authors raised the
possibility that some concepts now found in both may be dropped without consequence from
article 2. See id. at 410 & n.2. They used as examples the duty of good faith and the doctrine
ofunconscionability. See id. at 410 n.2; see also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1998) (duty of good faith);
id. § 2-302 (unconscionability); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (duty
of good faith); id. § 208 (unconscionability). The unstated assumption is that these concepts
will remain part of a larger body of commercial law, concurrently available to courts as a
source oflaw for deciding cases under the Code.
57. This rule originated in the venerable case of Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep.
250 (K.B. 1818). For a critique of this rule, see Ian R. Macneil, Time ofAcceptance: Too
Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1964). See also REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, ... an
acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes
the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without
regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror.").
58. See, e.g., Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415, 418 (lst Cir. 1929) (holding that the place
where telegraphed acceptance was received was the place where the contract was formed).
Section 64 of the Second Restatement of Contracts treats acceptance by any medium of
instantaneous two-way communication the same as if the parties were in the presence of one
another.
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than it is to paper-based communication, .the article 2 drafting
committee has decided to scrap the mailbox rule in favor of a time-ofreceipt rule when an "offer'' evokes an electronic message in response
(the "acceptance").59 In short, article 2 cannot be isolated from the
legal system in which it will operate, and to draft wisely, that system
must be understood and taken into account.
The argument that the CISG was not drafted within a context of
established principles of domestic law is a serious warning to the
article 2 drafting committee, yet it is by no means a conclusive
argument against selective borrowing by that committee or by those
courts that view the judiciary as an instrument of legal change. To
conclude otherwise is essentially to take the position against any and
all legal change. ''New" law, whether effectuated by legislation or by
judges, will inevitably alter the corresponding background law.
Historically, this has never prevented drafting committees from
revising the Code or judges from adopting new rules to implement
new policies or inventing new implements for old policies.

B.

Differences in Scope

Moreover, some argue the CISG is not appropriate in toto as a
model for revising article 2 because the scope of each instrument is
different. 60 To be sure, the Convention does not track the Code in
every respect. In the first place, the CISG expressly excludes from its
coverage consumer sales and sales of ships, aircraft, and electricity. 61
The scope of the Code is not so limited. A further limitation upon the
scope of the CISG is that, although it governs the formation of the
sales contract and the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller,
it excludes certain questions relating to ''the validity of the contract or
of any of its provisions or of any usage."62 In contrast, article 2
contains rules of validity,63 including what is perhaps the most
powerful and far-reaching of all validity doctrines, the doctrine of
59. See U.C.C. § 2-204(e)(3)(A) (Interim Draft Nov. 1999).
60. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 29, at 2005-08; Speidel, supra note 29, at 173-74.
61. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 2. The consumer sales exception does not apply if
the seller "at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to
have known that the goods were bought for any such use." Id.
62. Id. art. 4(a). Capacity to contract, agency, fraud, duress, and coercion are among
the supplementary domestic doctrines that can bear on validity. See generally Helen
Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale ofGoods, 18 YALE J. lNT'L L. l (1993 ).
63. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1998) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is void as a penalty."); id. § 2-725(1) ("By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.").
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unconscionability.64 Finally, the scope of the CISG differs from the
Code in three other important respects: · first, the CISG is not
concerned with the effect of the contract on the property in the goods
sold;65 second, it does not apply to claims for death or personal injury
caused by the goods;66 and third, it is silent on the rights of third
persons who are not parties to the contract.67
The principle problem with this argument as a basis for rejecting
the CISG is that the issue of scope is complex and sometimes highly
controversial. An example of this is the brief history of the drafting
committee's involvement with computer software and other related
intangibles. In November 1992, the committee was instructed by the
NCCUSL to prepare a review of article 2 focusing on sections that
may require revision if software contracts are included in article 2.68
To carry out this new charge, the committee adopted what became
!mown as the ''hub and spoke" approach. 69 The idea was that the
scope of revised article 2 would be broadened to cover three
transactions involving the transfer of interests in personal property:
the sale of goods, the lease of goods, and the transfer of intangibles
such as data, technology, and other intellectual property.70 The
objective of this approach was to state principles common to all in the
''hub" and to state principles unique to each in the "spoke."71 In 1995,
however, the NCCUSL formed a separate article 2B committee to deal
with software and licenses of information and directed the article 2
committee to return to its original job of drafting a new sales article.72

64. See id. § 2-302.
65. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 4(b). Article 2, on the other hand, includes not just
a statement of the good faith purchase doctrine, see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1998), but also
statements that define the remedial rights on the claims of third persons. See, e.g., id. § 2-502
(buyer's right to goods on seller's insolvency); id. § 2-402 (rights of seller's creditors against
sold goods).
66. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 5. In a proper case, article 2 permits recovery for
all types ofinjury. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1998) ("Consequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach include ... injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.'').
67. Article 2 permits certain claims to be brought by parties not in privity who are
affected by the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1998).
68. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 281, 290
(1993).
69. See id. at318-22.
70. See id. at 319-28.
71. See id. at319-20.
72. See U.C.C. art. 2B preface (Tentative Draft Apr. 28, 1998).
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This decision was made, not because the hub and spoke approach was
illogical, but because it was controversial.73
Another example is the controversy of whether article 2 should
apply to products liability cases involving personal injury or injury to
property other than the goods sold. The current impetus for this debate
is the ALI's recent adoption of the Third Restatement of Torts:
Products Liability,74 which addresses the liability of commercial
manufacturers and sellers for hann caused by their defective
products.75 The Third Restatement is the Institute's effort to restate
products liability law more than a quarter century after section 402A
was adopted as part of the Second Restatement of Torts. It is not
smprising that the Institute would seek to jealously guard the turf
carved out by the new Restatement and argue for a diminished role for
the Code in this important area. Specifically, there is disagreement
over whether the tests for merchantability and defectiveness should be
the same when personal injuries or damage to property are involved.
The article 2 committee's eventual response will be to describe the
merchantability/defect relationship in the official comments rather than
in the black-letter Code law, an apparent attempt to legislate by
comment:
When recovezy is sought for injury to person or property, whether
goods are merchantable is to be determined by applicable state products
liability law.
When, however, a claim for injury to person or property is based on
an implied warranty of fitness under Section 2-405 or an express
warranty under Sections 2-403 or 2-408, this Article determines
whether an implied warranty of fitness or an express warranty was
made and breached, as well as what damages are recoverable under
Section 2-806.76

In these circumstances, it is odd to suggest that the CISG cannot
substitute for article 2 merely because the scope of each is different.
To be sure, the committee has never assumed that the scope of revised
73. See id. The fate of the hub and spoke project is reminiscent of what happened to
the so-called ''New Payments Code." The goal of that project was to combine UCC articles 3
and 4 and other areas of commercial law dealing with payments into one unified treatment
within the Code. Opposition was so strong that after years of work the project was dropped.
See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a La~er, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the
Process ofRevising UCCArticles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REY. 743, 745-46 (1993).
74. The ALI finally adopted the Restatement on May 20, 1997.
75. See generally Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability-The American Law Institutes Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26
HOFSfRA L. REY. 743 (1998) (describing the transition from the Second to the Third
Restatement).
76. U.C.C. § 2-404 cmt 4 (Proposed Final Draft May 1, 1999) (emphasis omitted).
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article 2 would remain the same as the current version. It is thus
plausible that, after careful review and deliberation, the committee
would choose to narrow the scope of article 2 in conformity with the
CISG even if the consequence of that decision is to produce a Code
that is radically different from the present one. Moreover, if the
committee prefers a broader statute, it always has the option of
choosing the CISG initially and then adding provisions to extend its
scope where appropriate. Finally, rejection of the CISG has no bearing
on the less global issue of whether some of its provisions are suitable
for incorporation into revised article 2 or the common law either in
substitution of, or in addition to, existing rules.
One other facet of the scope argument should be mentioned: the
absence in the CISG of certain provisions with which American
attorneys have long been familiar. For example, there is no statute of
:frauds77 or parol evidence rule, 78 or requirement of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of a contract. 79 These gaps in the
CISG's coverage do not justify a general preference for the historical
scope of article 2. These rules would require some reconsideration
even if the drafting committee faced no problems of scope. Those
who urge rejection of the CISG because these provisions are absent
must explain why any perceived problem caused by the substantive
gaps created cannot be handled by selective supplementation.

77. The CISG provides that "[a] contract of sale need not be concluded in or
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form." CISG, supra
note 18, art. 11. Article 12, however, permits ·contracting states to make a declaration under
article 96 to prevent the application of article 11. See id. art. 12. If either party to a contract
has its place of business in a contracting state that has made such a declaration, then
applicable domestic law dictates the extent to which an evidentiazy writing is necessazy. See
id.; id. art. 96. Interestingly, the article 2 drafting committee decided to abolish the statute of
frauds in 1993, see U.C.C. § 2-201 (Revised Draft Dec. 21, 1993), and reversed that decision
in 1996, see id. § 2-201 (Revised Draft July 1997).
78. The language of CISG article 8 that "due consideration is to be given to all
relevant circumstances of the case" is essentially a rejection of the parol evidence rule.
CISG, supra note 18, art. 8(3). Unfortunately, not all courts agree with this conclusion.
Compare MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Cerarnica Nuova D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d
1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that article 8(3) permits the introduction of parol
evidence), with Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc.,
993 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the parol evidence rule applies to
CISG cases).
79. "Good faith" is a basic principle running throughout article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C.
§§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103(l)(b) (1998). Good faith is relevant to interpretation of the CISG
only; there is no general obligation that the parties carry out their obligations in good faith.
See CISG, supra note 18, art. 7(1 ). Notwithstanding the literal language of article 7(1 ), some
commentators have suggested that it does impose a duty to act in good faith in a CISGcovered case. See Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastelys Rhetorical Analysis, 8
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 623, 630-35 (1988).
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In sum, in deciding whether to adopt the CISG, it is not enough
to point out the differences in scope between it and the current article
2. It is also necessary for the drafting committee to have the
appropriate conception regarding the scope of the new statute.
Although much more can and should be said about issues of scope, the
purpose of this subpart is to facilitate a better understanding of the
options that were available to the drafting committee and to show that
the choices made should not necessarily affect the influence the CISG
might have with courts.

C

Differences in Substance

From the very beginning, it was obvious to everyone involved in
the drafting of the CISG that successful delocalization of commercial
This is quite
law depended upon a spirit of compromise.
understandable. Those participating in the project represented a
variety of legal traditions, cultures, and economic systems. If the
participants had insisted on retaining domestic legal concepts, it is
clear that nothing would have been accomplished. 80
Consider the question of interest. Article 78 states that if a party
fails to pay the price or any other "sum that is in arrears," the other
party is entitled to interest on it.81 Notice that nothing is said about the
formula to calculate the rate of interest. This is because the provisions
on interest were the subject of great controversy and differences of
opinion; hence, it was difficult to agree on a solution that would satisfy
the majority.
First, different national legal systems treat the
entitlement to interest differently, and some even forbid the charging
of interest entirely.82 A further difficulty arose from the fact that any
reference to an external standard, such as the official discount rate or
the prime rate, would not work because these rates do not exist in
80. See Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 265, 268 (1984) ("The
Convention of necessity is a compromise between the Jong held doctrinal tenets of the
common-Jaw system and the civil-Jaw systems; between individualistic, captalistic [sic]
systems and collectivistic, socialistic systems; between developed, industrial societies and
underdeveloped societies seeking a new international economic order.").
81. CISG, supra note 18, art. 78.
82. See Jelena Vilus, Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and the
Buyer, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF Gooos: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 239, 252 (Petar Sar~evic
& Paul Volken eds., 1986). For example, the Muslim countries objected to an interest rate
provision because it would be contrary to Islamic Jaw. See id. Curiously, Muslim countries
do permit the buyer to recover interest in cases where the seller is bound to return the price.
Consequently, they did not object to article 84(1) which provides that "[i]f the seller is bound
to refund the price, he must also pay interest on it, from the date on which the price was
paid." CISG, supra note 18, art. 84(1).
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some countries.83 Finally, there was disagreement as to whether the
rate, however defined, should be one applicable in the creditor's
country or in the buyer's.84 Legislative silence was, therefore, chosen
as the perfect compromise. The result is that article 78 is "a provision
based, as it were, on the highest common factor." 85
Given such a background, it should not be surprising to discover
that the cISG does not follow the style or arrangement of article 2.
Many of the articles in the CISG are drafted differently, and many new
terms are employed. The approach of the CISG to the buyer's rights
on an improper delivery is a good example. Under the Code, if the
seller's tender fails in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may either accept or reject the goods.86 Once the goods have been
accepted, the buyer can avoid an action for the price only if permitted
to revoke her acceptance. 87 If the buyer has either rightfully rejected
or justifiably revoked acceptance, she may then cancel the contract. 88
A key distinction between the Code and the CISG is that the latter
makes "avoidance" the remedial linchpin of the buyer's right to
tenninate the contractual relationship of the parties.89 The remedy of
avoidance will, in tum, depend on whether the seller has committed a
":fundamental breach.''9° If the seller has committed a :fundamental
breach, the buyer can avoid the contract. Subject to one exception, if
the seller has not committed a :fundamental breach, the buyer cannot
As Professor Harry Fletchner concisely
avoid the contract.91
83. See B. Nicholas, Article 78, in CoMMENTARYONTIIEINTERNATIONALSALESLAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CoNVENTION, supra note 35, at 568, 569-70.
84. Seeid.
85. U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 11th plen.
mtg. at 226, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981). During the course of the Conference's
preparations, article 78 was referred to as-article "73 bis." See id. at 486.
86. This is known as the Code's "perfect tender rule." See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998).
The perfect tender rule is, however, limited to single-delivery contracts. If the contract is an
installment contract, see id. § 2-612(1), the buyer may reject a delivery only "if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured." Id § 2612(2).
87. See id. §§ 2-607 to -608. Unlike the remedy of rejection, revocation of
acceptance is permitted only if the nonconformity causes substantial impairment of value.
See id. § 2-608(1). Both rightful rejection and justifiable revocation relieve the buyer of the
responsibility to pay for the goods and entitle the buyer to market/contract price or cover
damages. See id.§§ 2-711 to-713.
88. See id.§ 2-711(1). The buyer's rightto cancel is located in section 2-703(f).
89. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 49.
90. See id. art. 49(1)(a). A breach "is fundamental ifit results in such detriment to
the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the
contract," provided this result is foreseeable. Id. art. 25.
91. There is one situation apart from fundamental breach that allows a buyer to avoid
the contract Um;ler article 49, the buyer can avoid the contract if, in the case of nondelivery,
the seller does not or will not deliver the goods within the additional time fixed by the buyer
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explaine4 ''For those schooled in Article 2 of the U.C.C., the
Convention's use of avoidance/nonavoidance rather than
acceptance/nonacceptance significantly changes the analysis of
remedies. In some situations, the Convention's approach produces
notably different results.''92 For instance, suppose that the seller
tenders goods with minor defects. The article 2 buyer can reject
(avoid) and recover damages to compensate for the lost favorable
exchange.93 Moreover, if the exchange turns out to be a bad bargain,
the perfect tender rule provides the buyer with an easy means of
escape.94 Because the CISG contains a single standard of :fundamental
breach applicable in all circumstances, avoidance (rejection) is not a
remedial option.95 Under the CISG, therefore, the exchange will go
forward with damages or other remedies to compensate for the defects.
There are several other notable differences in substance between
the CISG and article 2. For example, the contract formation scheme is
one aspect of the CISG in which a lawyer trained in the common law
and the Code is likely to find some surprises. One striking feature of
the Convention's formation rules is that an acceptance of an offer is
effective when it reaches the offeror and not when mailed as provided
by the common-law ''mailbox rule.''9 6 However, one important effect
of the mailbox rule is retained: an offeror may not revoke an offer
once the offeree has dispatched her acceptance. 97
A more appreciable disparity is that the CISG's provisions
defining acceptance seem to codify the common-law ''mirror-image"
rule. 98 If the purported acceptance contains any additions, limitations,
or other modifications of an offer, article 19(1) labels it as a rejection
and a counteroffer.99 Article 19(2) apparently softens this rule
somewhat by providing that if the additional or different terms do not
in a Nachfrist notice under article 47. See id. arts. 47, 49. For discussion of the Nachfrist
procedure, see infra note 286 and text accompanying notes 295-302.
92. Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention:
ThePerspectivefromArticle2 ofthe U.C.C., 8 J.L. & CoM. 53, 57 (1988).
93. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998). This example assumes a single-delivery contract
For a discussion of installment contracts, see supra note 86.
94. See U.C.C. § 2-601. This statement embodies two assumptions. The first is that
the seller cannot or chooses not to cure the breach under section 2-508. The second
assumption is that the buyer is not acting in bad faith under section 1-203 or section 2103(l)(b).

95. See CISG, supra note 18, arts. 25, 49.
96. See id. art 18(2). For a discussion of the ''mailbox rule," see supra note 57 and
accompanying text
97. See CISG, supra note 18, art 16(1 ).
98. See id. art 19. For a further discussion of this rule, see infra notes 146-161 and
accompanying text
99. See CISG, supra note 18, art 19.
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"materially altet''.the terms of the offer, a contract is formed unless the
offeror objects to the discrepancy. 100 However, when one considers the
breadth of the Convention's definition of terms that materially alter an
offer, it is obviohs that the CISG has adopted the mirror-image rule
hook, line, and sinker.
Section 2-207 of the Code, on the other hand, approaches the
matter from an entirely different direction. 101 Section 2-207(1)
radically departs from the mirror-image rule by providing that an
expression of acceptance containing additional or different terms
operates as an acceptance unless the acceptance is expressly made
conditional on the offeror's assent to the additional terms. 102 This
difference in approach is most relevant in transactions involving what
has become known as the ''battle of the forms." 103
In those situations where the parties have exchanged writings
containing varying terms, short of performance, there will be fewer
binding contracts under the CISG than under the Code. Moreover, the
Convention and the Code will probably lead to different results in the
event that the parties exchange conflicting forms and subsequently
perform. Assuming that the offeree's reply contains terms that are
materially different from those contained in the offer, two outcomes
are possible under the Code: (1) If the reply constitutes the requisite
"definite and seasonable expression of acceptance," a contract is
formed on the offeror's terms; 104 or (2) If the reply is not an
acceptance, the contract formed by performance will include only
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any necessary Code gap fillers. 105 In disputes governed by the CISG,
the resulting contract will always be on the terms of the party who

100. Seeid.
101. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1998).
102. See id. Section 2-207(2) resolves the issue of which provisions are part of the
final contract.
103. The official comments to UCC section 2-207 give a classic description of the
battle of the forms phenomenon:
A frequent example ... is the exchange of printed purchase order and acceptance
(sometimes called "acknowledgment") forms. Because the forms are oriented to
the thinking of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do
not correspond. Often the seller's form contains terms different from or additional
to those set forth in the buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the
transaction.
Id. § 2-207 cmt. I. If the parties do not proceed with the transaction because one party
repudiates, the issue becomes whether the exchange of forms created a contract.
104. Id. § 2-207(1).
105. See id. § 2-207(3); see also id. §§ 2-305 to -311 (identifying the gap fillers to be
used unless the parties agree otherwise).
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sends the last counteroffer. 106 Although the identity of that party will
naturally depend on the circumstances, most often it will be the seller
who aclmowledges the buyer's purchase order before shipping the
goods. Thus, under the CISG, because acceptance of the goods by the
buyer is an acceptance of the seller's counteroffer, the buyer is bound
by the provisions in the aclmowledgment. 107 In short, the CISG
resurrects the "last shof' outcome that article 2 rejects.
There are many other aspects of the CISG that are different from
the Code. These differences take many forms, but most spring from a
tendency to fashion compromises among legal traditions and
economic regions. 108 This tendency is not, by itself, a problem.
Compromise can be considered a problem only against some
normative background that distinguishes good commercial law from
bad commercial law. Those who have taken the position that article 2
should not be modeled after the CISG because the latter is
substantively different must therefore distinguish objectionable from
unobjectionable differences. This they have not done. There is,
however, at least one legitimate reason for resisting wholesale
adoption of an instrument that draws heavily on diverse traditions and
backgrounds. If the CISG were suddenly to replace the Code, it would
unsettle understandings and case law that have grown up around the
present statutory structure and language. To the extent that continuity
with the past is normatively compelling, the rejection of the CISG as
the ''new'' article 2 is normatively warranted as well. The more
difficult questions are whether courts should or will take a constructive
role in the implementation of particular CISG innovations and what
effect, if any, the CISG is likely to have on the future application of the
Code. First, however, we must appreciate the usefulness of the
concept of habit to explain why particular cases are decided in a
certain way. As the next Part suggests, habit possesses strong
motivational properties likely to affect judicial att:itudes.

II.

THE RELEVANCE OF HABIT IN SHAPING JUDICIAL OUTCOMES

The traditional legal model ofjudicial decision making posits that
the law and the dispute determine outcomes. In this model, judges are
viewed as neutral arbiters who remain unfettered by societal biases
106. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 19.
107. The seller will argue that by accepting the goods, the buyer engaged in "conduct
... indicating assent to [the] offer." Id. art. 18(1 ).
108. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW. 443, 452-80
(1989).
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and can focus on case facts, precedent, and legislative intent when
deciding cases. 109 In contrast, the dominant tendency of social
scientists is to emphasize that the law holds little sway in shaping
outcomes. 110 The underlying premise of this extralegal model is that
judges resolve disputes based on external factors, such as the judges'
role orientations, attitudes, partisanship, and parochial values. 111 Yet
these theoretical approaches are insufficient as complete explanations
for judicial decision making. While both models of behavior have
many advantages and lead to insights that the other ignores, neither
one provides a complete understanding of the factors that influence
judges. Perhaps most important, each model assumes that only legal
or extralegal cues matter. What ·is needed, therefore, is a more

109. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURrS OF APPEALS IN TIIE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTII, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CiRCtnTS
162 (1981) ("Only one [circuit] judge [swveyed] unqualifiedly endorsed the view thatjudges
should merely interpret the law, a traditional conception of judicial duty still prominent on
several state supreme courts and trial courts."); C.I<. ROWLAND & ROBEIIT A. CARP, POLITICS
AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURrS 3 (1996) ("In many cases dispute resolution ..•
approximates the traditional, mechanical model of judicial norm enforcement-that is, the
trial judge 'finds' the law, 'fits' the law to the facts, and rules in favor of the litigant whose
facts fit the law.''). For a judicial expression of this view, see United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936), in which the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action
of the people's representatives. This is a misconception. . . . When an act of
Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the
constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.
Id. at62.
110. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CoURr AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 1 (1993) ("As we demonstrate, the legal model serves only to cloakto conceal-the motivations that cause the justices to decide as they do.'').
111. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROIIDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURr DECISION
MAKING 72 (1976) ("[A]ll three factors-goals, rules, and situations-may affect decisions
and outcomes.''); ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 109, at vii ("[P]olitical scientists rejected the
assumptions of mechanical, precedent-bound jurisprudence in favor of the heretical notion
that justices' decisions could be characterized as 'votes,' and that these votes were motivated
by their personal beliefs and policy preferences.''); James L. Gibson, Judges' Role
Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REY. 911,
911 (1978) ("[T]here appears to be a consensus that attitudes and role orientations are
important predictors of behavior ... .''); Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial
Policy-Making and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 919 (1975) (''The racial
attitudes developed by these judges through a lifetime cannot be expected to disappear with
the acquisition of judicial robes.''); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Discriminant Function and a
Theoretical Context for Its Use in Estimating the Votes ofJudges, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
REsEARcH 335, 342 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969) ("[A] judge, in
selecting a response to a particular situation, must have some knowledge of his preferences,
the alternative actions open to him, and the relationship or effect of these actions on his
preferences.'').
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dynamic model that addresses both types of cues. 112 This Part does not
purport to advance such a fully integrated attitude-behavior model, nor
does it attempt to identify all the variables playing a role in the
decision process. Other scholars are better equipped to carzy out such
a mission. Instead, the goal is to develop a partial explanation of
judicial behavior that links case outcomes to habit and then to look for
corroborating evidence of this explanation in several reported cases.
In general, early behavioral research on judicial decision making
was uniconceptual in its approach. The predominant model focused
almost exclusively on attitude as the key predictor of behavior. 113 As
originally stated, this rests on the assumption that judges, like most
other decision makers in political institutions, render their decisions
based upon their personal attitudes and values. 114 Specifically, judges'
attitudes dictate the substantive objectives they hope to achieve
through their decisions. Thus, the notion that behavior is predicated
solely on external legal stimuli is explicitly rejected. Yet, while
attitude may be a partial explanation for behavior, there can be little
doubt that additional factors affect the process.
We seem to know intuitively that judges do not, and cannot,
simply do what they want. Without some external restraints, courts
would lose their moral and political legitimacy. There must be norms
of behavior that constrain the activities of judges. Several scholars
have suggested that the relationship between attitudes and behavior is,
therefore, modified by the concept of role orientation.115 Role
112. See ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 109, at 131-51; see also Tracey E. George &
Lee Epstein, On the Nature ofSupreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Ser. REY. 323,
334 (1992) ("[I]he most complete explanation ofjudicial outcomes should incorporate legal
and extralegal factors. Seen in this light, the views of neither the classical legal thinkers nor
the behavioralists are incorrect; but they are incomplete.").
113. See Gibson, supra note 111, at 912 (''There is little question that the predominant
paradigm of judicial decision making places judges' attitudes in the center of the process.
Indeed, it is not an overstatement to assert that attitudinal approaches have become the
traditional nontraditional mode ofjudicial analysis.").
114. See, e.g., Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961
Tenn ofthe United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 100, 134-35 (1963)
("Mariance in the voting behavior of the justices during the 1961 Term can be adequately
accounted for by the differences in their attitudes towards the fundamental issues of civil
liberty and economic liberalism."); Joseph Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial
Decisions, 79 HAR.v. L. REY. 1583, 1583 (1966) ("Malue structure leads to judicial attitudes,
to predispositions toward deciding given types of cases in particular ways. A judge may, for
example, be predisposed to support-or to deny-legal claims by labor unions, criminal
defendants, racial minorities, federal regulatory agencies, or state and local authorities.'').
115. See Victor Eugene Flango et al., The Concept of Judicial Role: A
Methodological Note, 19 AM. J. POL. Ser. 277, 280 (1975) ("Preliminary data analysis
convinced us that judicial discretion was in fact composed of not one but two separate
dimensions-precedent orientation and public orientation.''); James L. Gibson, The Role
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orientation has been defined as a "psychological construct which is the
combination of the [judge's] perception of the role expectations of
significant others and his or her own norms and expectations of proper
behavior for a judge."116 When role orientations are combined with
attitudes, a model of behavior is created that predicts that judges will
do what they prefer only if they believe that it would be consistent
with what they are supposed to do. 117
If judges' decisions are a function of their attitudes and role
orientations, it is fruitful to consider the processes through which these
attitudes and orientations are acquired. Although one can conceive of
many sources of influence, 118 the specific effect of law schools on
judges' values cannot be ignored. 119 The impact of a law school
education on behavior can be easily demonstrated through reference to
one of the most fundamental aspects of judge-based law-the practice
of precedent.
Precedent is best lmown as stare decisis et non quieta movere,
translated to mean "let the decision stand and do not disturb things
which have been settled"120 or "stand by the precedents and do not
disturb the calm."121 It is this system of precedent that is emblematic
of legal study, described as "the task of training students to discern the
'holdings' of cases and to determine whether those precedent cases
have been followed, appropriately distinguished, or overruled in
subsequent cases."122 Students are taught not only that adherence to

Concept in Judicial Research, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 291, 302-04 (1981); Thomas D. Ungs &
Larry R. Baas, Judicial Role Perceptions: A Q-Technique Study of Ohio Judges, 6 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 343, 343 (1972)..
116. Gibson, supra note 111, at 917.
117. See id. One important dimension of role orientation concerns the criteria that
judges consider to be legitimate determinants of decisions-that is, the extent to which
factors other than existing case law can appropriately be considered. A judge who believes it
is proper to be influenced by variables other than precedent is far more likely to be creative in
her decisions (some might refer to her as an activist judge) than one who does not. See id. at
917-18.
118. It has been suggested, for example, that the greatest impact on the values of
judges derives from career experiences. See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models ofthe
Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Courl Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberlies and
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 355, 359-60 (1981).
119. See, e.g., RICHARD NEELY, JUDICIAL JEOPARDY: WHEN BUSINESS COLLIDES wrm
THE COURTS 64 (1986) ("Students try to please their teachers throughout their lives; therefore,
the type of education that a professional class receives influences the actions of that class for
a generation.'').
120. John Paul Stevens, The Life Span ofa Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1
n.2 (1983) (quoting Justice Arthur Goldberg).
121. Id. (quoting Justice Stanley Reed).
122. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 3, 3 (1989).
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precedent increases e:ffi.ciency123 and predictability,124 but that justice in
fact requires that like cases be treated alike. 125 Precedent creates a
reverence for the past that is almost certainly a value that influences
attitude and helps define the relationship between role orientations and
the legitimacy of various decision-making criteria126
The concept of precedent is not necessarily confined to the
courtroom; it is also used in nonlegal decision making. Often we give
weight to prior decisions simply because they are similar to the
situation at hand. 127 In everyday explanations of behavior, this is what
we call habit, especially if habit is conceptualized, as it is here, as an
acquired behavioral disposition based on past conduct. 128 Judges, too,
surely acquire habits of decision making influenced by an allegiance to

123. The use of precedent dispenses with the need for a judge to reinvent the law in
each and every case. Justice Cardozo made this point when he stated that ''the labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." BENJAMINN. CARDOZO,
THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 149 (1921).
124. Predictability is the most common justification for precedent. See David Lyons,
Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REv. 495, 496 (1985) (''The reason
most often given for the practice of precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial
decisions.''); Earl Maltz, The Nature ofPrecedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 368 (1988) ("The
most commonly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the need for
certainty in the law.''). Without predictability, people would be unable to plan their affairsbusiness or otherwise-with any degree of legal certainty. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare
Decisis and Judicial Restraint, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1990, at 15, 18 (noting that predictability
of outcome "is especially important in cases involving property rights and commercial
transactions'').
125. The justice argument can be summarized as follows: "Like cases must be treated
alike or else someone is being treated unfairly; therefore, decision makers must treat the
parties in the instant case the same as parties in earlier s:ases were treated." Theodore M.
Benditt, The Rule ofPrecedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 90 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
126. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text; see also Theodore L. Becker, A
Survey Study ofHawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions ofJudicial Role Variations, 60
AM. POL. Ser. REv. 677, 678-79 (1966) (suggesting that judges believe that the most
important variable that can permissibly influence their behavior is precedent).
127. See JOHN CH!PMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 198
(MacMillan Co. 2d ed. 1921) (1909) ("Precedent has a very wide meaning. It covers
everything said or done which furnishes a rule for subsequent practice, especially in matters
of form or ceremony.''); Benditt, supra note 125, at 89 (''The idea of following precedent has
a powerful hold on us, not only within law but also outside ofit.'').
128. In simple terms, habit denotes one's customary way of behaving. It is a
"relatively consistent pattern of thought or attitudes." J.P. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 210 (1968). As early as 1890, William James proposed that habits act as
motivators and maintain social structure by providing continuity to experience and behavior.
In his words, "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative
agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of
fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor.'' 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY 121 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1950) (1890).
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precedent and an emotional attachment to the legal traditions taught in
law school. Karl Llewellyn put it this way:
The foundation, then, of precedent is the official analogue of what, in
society at large, we know as folkways, or as institutions, and of what, in
the individual, we know as habit. And the things which make for
precedent in this broad sense are the same which make for habit and for
institutions. It takes time and effort to solve problems. Once you have
solved one it seems foolish to reopen it. Indeed, you are likely to be
quite impatient with the notion of reopening it. Both inertia and
convenience speak for building further on what you have already built;
for incorporating the decision once made, the solution once worked out,
into your operating technique without reexamination of what earlier
went into reaching your solution. . . . Finally, it is clear that if the
written records both exist and are somewhat carefully and continuously
consulted, the possibility of change creeping into the practices
unannounced is greatly lessened. . . . ['f]he lawyer searches the records
for convenient cases . . . [and] capitalizes the hwnan drive toward
repetition by finding, by making explicit, by urging, the prior cases. 129

The intellectual stubbornness brought on by habit may lead
judges to reject not only optional innovations that may present
themselves but may also provoke them to construe mandatory
provisions as if no change had occurred. Dean Roscoe Pound
provides a powerful example of the latter process in his appraisal of
the Field Code of Procedure on the one-hundredth-year anniversary of
its adoption by New York. 130 The Field Code, truly a historic
achievement, literally rid procedural law of centuries of accumulated
archaisms and abolished the distinction between actions at law and
suits in equity. 131 The problem with its adoption, according to Pound,
was that although the law was ripe for change, the legal profession was
not. 132 The courts were simply unwilling to take a constructive role in
implementing the reforms contained in Field's remarkable code,
preferring, instead, to maintain historical continuity.133 Some courts
even went so far as to declare it beyond the reach of the legislature to
129. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 64-65
(1951); see also ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82 (1938)
(''Tenacity of a taught legal tradition is much more significant in our legal history than the
economic conditions of time and place.").
130. See Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD:
CENTENARY EssAYS 3; 13-14 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949).
131. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REY. 909, 931-39 (1987)
(critiquing the merger oflaw and equity in the Field Code).
132. See Pound, supra note 130, at 13-14.
133. Seeid.
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alter a scheme so :fundamental as the division between law and
equity.134 Moreover, the courts were not the only saboteurs of the
Field Code; the law schools, too, contributed to the maintenance of the
pre-Code system by refusing to teach the new law in the spirit in
which it was written. 135
The inertia of habit, however, is not forever. Eventually, when
the supporting environment for performance shifts (e.g., the law
changes), new behaviors develop. Today, the innovations of the Field
Code are accepted as a matter of course. Unfortunately, David Dudley
Field would have needed to wait an additional eighty years to see his
ideas finally take hold. 136
At this point, some are likely to remain skeptical about the
contention that what is being called habit influences judicial behavior.
They may argue that the analysis so far presented proves too little
because there are other, more conventional, explanations for judicial
decisions-for instance, the possibility that the court simply
misunderstood the relevant law. But there is one distinct respect in
which this criticism misses the point. This Article does not argue that
an explanation based on habit is always preferred, nor that habit is
always causal. The suggestion is only that habit may be a factor and
134. See id. at 14.
135. See id. In this connection, consider another interesting bit ofhistorical reflection:
Man is the creature of habit To some extent doing away with conscious
effort and deliberation permits a fuller life. On the other hand, being the slave of
habit induces an indifferent acquiescence in things as they are and have been.
Examine the history of the criminal code of England. Sir Samuel Romilly
advocated and eventually secured the passage in the House of Commons of a bill
to abolish the death penalty for stealing privately, in a shop, goods to the value of
five shillings. But when this modest reform went to the House of Lords it was
defeated by the united opposition of Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough and Lord
Chancellor Eldon who consistently fought any change in the law, urging that the
existing law was the very perfection of reason and that the criminal code could not
be too severe. Ellenborough stormed and blustered and threatened, and Eldon
implored and entreated and wept over the proposal to bring about "startling and
dangerous innovations." Ellenborough summed up his views on tlte bill by saying:
''There is a dangerous spirit of innovation abroad upon this subject, but against
which I have ever and always shall be a steady opposer." Yes, it has truly been
said that, for many, there is no pain as great and as hard to bear as the pain of a new
idea
Bernard L. Shientag, 11ze Human Element in Judicial and in Administrative Procedure, in
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY EsSAYS, supra note 130, at 215, 218 (footnote omitted).
136. As Pound points out
Much of what is now accepted as a matter of course in legal procedure
could have been attained at least eighty years before the Federal Rules of 1938 if
Field's Code of Civil Procedure had been developed and applied in its spirit
instead of in the spirit of maintaining historical continuity.
Pound, supra note 130, at 14.
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that paying attention to it will enhance our understanding of decision
making. In order to explore ~s point further, let us consider some
modem examples in which the close :functional relationship between
habit and outcome may have been obscured by the potentially
misleading nature of traditional explanations.

A.

Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co.

The well-known case Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. RP. Bartlett & Co.
provides a perfect example of the force of habit that contributes to, and
is inherent in, the judicial process.137 In Roto-Lith, the buyer, a
manufacturer of cellophane bags, mailed the seller a written order to
purchase a drum of ''N-132-C" emulsion, stating ''End use: wet pack
spinach bags."138 The seller mailed the buyer an acknowledgment of
the order three days later and shipped the goods on the next day. 139
The acknowledgment, which arrived no later than the goods, was a
preprinted form. On the front, in conspicuous type, all warranties,
express and implied, were disclaimed, and the sale was made "subject
to the terms on the reverse side."140 On the reverse side, a clause stated
that the buyer assumed the risk "for results obtained from use of these
goods, whether used alone or in combination with other products."141
Moreover, the form limited the seller's liability to "replacement of any
goods that materially differ from the Seller's sample order on the basis
of which the order for such goods was made."142 Finally, a clause
provided that "[i]f these terms are not acceptable, Buyer must so notify
Seller at once."143 The buyer accepted and paid for the goods without
objection.144 When the emulsion proved to be defective and the buyer
sought damages for breach of warranty, the court had to determine
whether the disclaimer and the remedy limitation clauses in the seller's
acknowledgment form relieved the seller of liability.145
Consider what would have been the common-law response to the
Roto-Lith facts and the seemingly inevitable tension between "freedom
from contracf' and the modem business practice of using standard
forms. According to traditional contract doctrine, an acceptance must
137. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), overrnled by Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc.,
100 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997).
13 8. Id. at 498 (internal quotations omitted).
139. See id.
140. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
141. Id. at 499 (internal quotations omitted).
142. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
143. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
144. Seeid.
145. See id. at 498.
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be on the terms proposed by the offeror without the slightest variation.
If there is a variance, no matter how minute, the purported acceptance
acts as a counteroffer and thereby a rejection of the offer. 146 Thus,
application of the "ribbon-matching'' or "mirror-image" rule in RotoLith would lead to the conclusion that because of the discrepancies in
the buyer's order and the seller's acknowledgment, there was no
contract when those forms were exchanged. But what about the fact
that the buyer paid for and used the goods?
A common-law corollary of the mirror-image rule is a maxim
colorfully called ''the last-shot principle."147 This principle is premised
on the simple notion that once the parties have performed, there is a
contract, and since each form subsequent to the first is a counteroffer,
the resulting contract must be on the terms of the party who sends the
last counteroffer, which is then accepted by the other party's
performance. 148 Therefore, the controlling terms are those contained
in the last shot fired. 149 In Roto-Lith, because the seller had the good
fortune to fire last, the terms in its acknowledgment would define the
contract. 150 Thus, the common-law result would be that seller
breached no warranty and, in any event, limited its liability to
replacement of the goods.
However, Roto-Lith was not a common-law case governed by
common-law rules. 151 Rather, for the first time, the court was given
the opportunity to apply section 2-207 of the Code to the ''battle of the

146. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 508 (5th ed.
1993) ("Every student knows of the 'mirror-image' rule of general contract law: An
'acceptance' which varies the tenns of an offer is not an acceptance at all, but a counteroffer."); see also Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415, 418-19 (1st Cir. 1929) (holding that the
language of an acceptance must be "unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance'');
Langellierv. Schaefer, 31N.W.690, 691(Minn.1887) (holding that an acceptance is vitiated
by "[any] qualification of departure from" the tenns of an offer); Poe! v. Brunswick-BalkeCollender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 621-22 (N.Y. 1915) (holding that an acceptance must not vary
from the offered terms); REsrATEMENT (FIRSr) OF CoNrRACTS § 60 (1932) ("A reply to an
offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires performance of
conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer."); K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law
ofContract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 30 (1938).
147. At least one writer has attributed this term to Professor William Hawkland. See
Frederick D. Lipman, On Winning the Battle ofthe Forms: An Analysis ofSection 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAW. 789, 792-93 (1969).
148. See Paul Barron & Thomas W. Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review,
Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 171, 176-77 (1975); Daniel A. Levin & Ellen
Blumberg Rubert, Beyond U.C.C. Section 2-207: Should Professor Mu"ay's Proposed
Revision Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & CoM. 175, 177-78 (1992).
149. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 176-77.
150. See Roth-Lith, 297 F.2d at 498-99.
151. Seeid.at499.
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fonns." 152 The drafters intended this section to alter substantially the
common-law mirror-image rule by providing in subsection (1) that an
expression of acceptance creates a binding contract, even though it
contains additional or different terms, unless the acceptance is coupled
with language making it conditional upon the offeror's assent to the
new tenns. 153 If the offeree does not use such conditional language,
the new terms are to be treated as proposals for additions to the
contract already created. 154 Between ''merchants," such terms become
part of the contract unless, inter alia, they materially alter it. 155
The Roto-Lith court was unwilling to countenance such a
fundamental change from common-law doctrine:
Perhaps it would be wiser in all cases for an offeree to say in so many
words, ''I will not accept your offer until you assent to the following:
* * *" But businessmen cannot be expected to act by rubric. It would
be unrealistic to suppose that when an offeree replies setting out
conditions that would be burdensome only to the offeror he intended to
make an unconditional acceptance of the original offer, leaving it
simply to the offeror's good nature whether he would assume the
additional restrictions. To give the statute a practical construction we
must hold that a response which states a condition materially altering
the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an "acceptance
* * * exnressly * * * conditional on assent to the additional * * *
terms."15"6

This was the court's first misstep. Totally ignored was the treatment of
material additions in subsection (2). 157 If the addition of a material
term in the offeree's response automatically creates a counteroffer,
then why does subsection (2) characterize it as a "proposalO for
addition to the contract''?158 Quite clearly, a proposal for addition to
the contract is a far different thing than a counteroffer. By
misconstruing the Code in this manner, the court effectively applied
the mirror-image rule.
The court's second misstep occurred when it brought back to life
the last-shot doctrine and held that the buyer became bound by the
terms in the seller's acknowledgment when it accepted the goods with

152. See id. The First Circuit applied Massachusetts law, and the Code in that state
was enacted in 1958,just four years before the case was decided. See id.
153. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 176-79.
154. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1998).
155. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 148, at 181-83 n.32.
156. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
157. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
158. Id.; see also Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 499 (quoting section 2-207).
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knowledge of those tenns. 159 This time the court failed to consider
section 2-207(3), which the drafters added primarily to cover the
situation where the initial exchange of fonns has not resulted in a
contract, but the parties perform as if they had a contract. 160 In such
cases, the tenns of the contract "consist of those tenns on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemental}' tenns
incorporated under any other provisions of this [Code]."161 Thus,
subsection (3) avoids the unfair imposition of the last-shot rule. If it
had been properly applied in Roto-Lith, the seller's disclaimer and
remedy limitations clauses would not have been part of the contract.
By now, courts162 and commentators163 alike acknowledge that
the Roto-Lith court frustrated the purpose of section 2-207 and
159. See Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
160. See William D. Hawkland, Jn Re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 512, 525
(1955).
Amended subsection [(3)] continues a rule of basic contract law which
makes enforceable "implied" contracts formed by the conduct of the parties.
While the subsection is undoubtedly redundant, it was included by the draftsmen to
make it clear that subsequent performance by the parties can save a contract, even
though initially no binding agreement had been formed because of the conflict of
forms.
Id.
161. u.c.c. § 2-207(3).
162. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan fut'! Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.5
{7th Cir. 1977) (noting that Roto-Lith has been criticized by commentators and not followed
by courts); Alloy Computer Prods., fuc. v. Northern Telecom, fuc., 683 F. Supp. 12, 14-15
(D. Mass. 1988) (following Roto-Lith notwithstanding the argument that "Roto-Lith has been
subjected to academic and judicial criticism, because it reverses the outcome that the plain
language of§ 2-207 would lead parties to expect"); Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co.,
524 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Del. 1981) ("Roto-Lith ... does not reflect the underlying
principles of the Code.''); Ebasco Servs., fuc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F.
Supp. 421, 437 (E.D. Pa 1975) ("Roto-Lith .•• has not been treated kindly by the cases or the
commentators.''); Uniroyal, fuc., v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571, 578 (fud.
Ct App. 1978) (stating that Roto-Lith ''revives the 'last-shot' technique" and "subvert[s] the
very purpose of§ 2-207'').
163. fu the first edition of their well-known casebook, Professors James White and
Robert Summers used the phrase "infamous case" to descnbe Roto-Lith. See JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERr S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF TiiE LAW UNDER TiiE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE
26 (1972); see also William B. Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of
Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus.
LAW. 75, 85-86, 86 n.30 (1963) ("fu the course ofits opinion the court remarked with respect
to § 2-207, 'The statute is not too happily drafted.' The draftsmen of the Code could, with
equal propriety, say of Roto-Lith, 'The opinion is not too happily written.'" (citation
omitted)). Nor did Roto-Lith fare better in the plethora of student notes it generated. See,
e.g., Note, Nonconforming Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An End to the Battle ofthe Forms, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 540 (1963); Recent Case, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1962); Recent Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1481 {1963). But see Note,
Uniform Commercial Code: Variation Between Offer and Acceptance Under Section 2-207,
1962 DUKEL.J. 613, 617 (characterizing Roto-Lith as "an equitable recognition ofreasonable
commercial expectations'').
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produced one of the most egregious misinterpretations of the Code to
date. Surely the critics are right that section 2-207 is a "miserable,
bungled, patched-up job," and "arguably the greatest statutory mess of
all time."164 But such a view certainly cannot excuse the court's error,
nor is it a sufficient explanation of why it occurred. According to the
account of judicial decision making advanced here, the court's
application of the statute cannot be so easily disentangled from the
judges' background characteristics, including their preferences and
attitudes.
Recall that Roto-Lith was decided in 1962. Each judge on the
panel received his legal education before the Code was enacted, and
each was appointed to the bench when the mirror-image rule was
being applied by courts ''with a rigor worthy of a better cause."165
Presumably, here is a case where the longtime habit of taught law
resulted in an intellectual attitude toward the issues that clouded the
judges' reading of the new Code and provided an alternative set of
rules for the court to apply. Only after thirty-five years of criticism
and a revision of the official comments to section 2-207166 did the First
Circuit finally admit its mistake in Roto-Lith. 167 This time the panel
consisted of three judges for whom experience and learning had led to
a habit of taught law that was decidedly different.

164. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), in SALES AND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 146, at 513, 514.
165. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONfRACTS § 2-21, at
102 (3d ed. 1987). The judges who participated in Roto-Lith were Bailey Aldrich (LL.B.,
1932), John Hartigan (LL.B., 1913), and Peter Woodbwy (LL.B., 1927).
166. The official comments to section 2-207 were revised in 1966, evidently in
response to the Roto-Lith case. In particular, a new comment 7 was added, which reads as
follows:
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before
any dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has been made. In such
cases, where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is not
necessary to determine which act or document constituted the offer and which the
acceptance. The only question is what terms are included in the contract, and
subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7 (1998) (citation omitted).
167. See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 188-90 (1st Cir. 1997).
The court clearly rejected the doctrine that the buyer's acceptance of the goods constitutes an
acceptance of the seller's terms, i.e., the last-shot rule. Not explicitly ovenuled, however,
was the holding in Roto-Lith that a response materially altering the offer is expressly
conditional under section 2-207(1 ). Presumably, it was not necessary for the court to address
this issue because the seller's form in Ionics, in fine print, stated that the seller was willing to
sell, "BUT ONLY UPON THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET FORTH HEREIN AND
ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AS A COUNTEROFFER." Id. at 185 (internal
quotations omitted).
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[I]n both the basic course on Contracts and advanced courses on Sales,
teachers and casebook authors have routinely denounced ... Roto-Lith,
Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co. for the past thirty years. Indeed, many firstyear students have realized that the Roto-Lith court not only distorted
the text of section 2-207, but also subverted the purposes of the Code
by applying the mirror image and last shot rules to an exchange of form
documents. An entire generation of lawyers and judges has thus
learned that neither mirror image nor last shot belongs in Article 2. 168

This discussion suggests that when intellectual habit no longer
corresponds to features of the legal environment, the habit will change.
However, the story of Roto-Lith proves that we may have to wait for
the next generation oflawyers and judges before this happens.
B.

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American National Bank

A second example of the influence of the intellectual habit of
taught law on judicial decision making is International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. American National Bank, in which the Florida
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the rule of priority
contained in UCC section 9-312(4). 169 On April 8, 1969, the borrower
in that case, Machek Farms, Inc., executed an installment note and
security agreement in favor of American National Bank. 170 The
security interest encompassed equipment presently owned by Machek
and also equipment that might be acquired in the future. 171 On April
25, 1969, Machek purchased, on credit, two items of farm equipment
from Florida Truck and Tractor Company. 172 Florida Truck retained a
security interest in these items, but no financing statement was ever
filed. 173 On August 8, 1969, seven additional items of equipment were
purchased from Florida Truck on similar terms. 174 Florida Truck
subsequently assigned the August 8 contract to International Harvester
Corporation. 175 On September 3, 1969, more than ten days after
168. Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision of
Article2, 51 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 599, 658 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
169. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla 1974). Section 9-312(4) provides: "A purchase money
security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security
interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days
thereafter." U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1998).
170. See American Nat' I Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726,
727 (Fla Dist Ct App. 1972), rev'd, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla 1974).
171. Seeid.
172. Seeid.
173. Seeid.
174. Seeid.
175. Seeid.
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Machek received possession of the equipment, International Harvester
filed a financing statement. 176 After Machek defaulted on both
contracts, it voluntarily returned all of the equipment purchased to
Florida Truck. 177 On December 7, 1970, American National Bank
instituted a replevin suit seeking possession of the farm equipment on
the basis of its earlier-in-time security agreement and financing
statement. 178
The question thus became: Does a previously perfected security
interest in after-acquired property take priority over the interest held by
a purchase money secured party who failed to file within the ten-day
grace period of section 9-312(4)?179 It is doubtful that anyone
schooled in article 9 would give the wrong answer to such a simple,
straightforward question. Every law student who takes a course in
article 9 is taught that if the seller or lender advancing the funds for the
purchase of goods fails to file within ten days after the debtor receives
the goods, the special purchase money priority is lost and, therefore,
the relative priority of the claimants is to be decided according to the
rules of section 9-312(5). 180 This will usually mean that the secured
party who files first will have priority. Since American National Bank
filed to perfect its security interest in Machek's after-acquired
176. Seeid.
177. See id.
178. Seeid.
179. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1998). The tenn ''purchase money security interest" is
defined in section 9-107, which provides.that a security interest is purchase money to the
extent that it is:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.
Id.§ 9-107.
180. See, e.g., 2 GRANT GIIMORE, SECURITY INrEREsTs IN PERSONAL PROPERrY § 295, at 799 (1965) (''The one condition for priority under§ 9-312(4) is that the purchase-money
interest be perfected 'at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten
days thereafter.'" (quoting u.c.c. § 9-312(4))); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 24-5, at 868 (4th ed. 1995) ("[W]hat rule governs priority if
the purchase money lender fails to comply with subsections (3) or (4) ... ? [That] case is
clearly governed by subsection (5) ... .'). At the time of the International Harvester
decision, section 9-312(5) of the Code provided in pertinent part:
(5) In all cases not governed by the rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined . . . in the
order offiling if both are perfected by filing ....
U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962). This subsection was revised as part of the 1972 official revision of
article 9, but not in a way that would have changed the court's analysis or the proper
resolution of this case.
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equipment long before International Harvester filed, American
National Bank should have prevailed. 181
While the result might seem obvious to today's law student, the
Florida Supreme Court, in a "masterpiece of statutory destruction,"182
held otherwise. The court began its opinion by recognizing that a
security interest in after-acquired property has priority under section 9312(5) unless the purchase money security interest is filed within the
requisite ten-day period. 183 So far, so good. However, the court
completely negated this priority by concluding that it is limited to the
debtor's equity, if any, in the property. 184 In most cases, this would be
tantamount to having no interest at all. In reaching such an
"inexplicable result,"185 the court relied on unspecified constitutional
and equitable principles that would be violated by granting a
''windfall" to the secured party with the interest in after-acquired
property. 186 Moreover, the court was influenced by the concept of title
that is expressed as follows: ''There really are no conflicting security
interests in this situation. That security interest retained by the
subsequent seller in the after-acquired property never passes to the
buyer-debtor and thus never becomes subject to the earlier creditor's
claim of security interest in such after-acquired property."187 The
court's holding subverts the drafters' clear intent to make the location
of title irrelevant for article 9 priority purposes. 188
181. Every other court that had decided this issue would have awarded priority to
American National Bank. See, e.g., United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp.
892 (W.D. Aik. 1964); National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone Co., 191N.E.2d471 (Mass.
1963); James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972); American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 (Okla 1970); Wilson v.
Burrows, 497 P.2d 240 (Utah 1972); Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 184 N.W.2d 122 (Wis.
1971).
182. See Barkley Clark, Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1377 (1987).
183. See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32,
33-34 (Fla 1974).
184. See id. Justice Carlton, in a lengthy dissent, makes the point that the majority
actually awarded priority to the purchase money creditor:
When the property is sold to satisfy the debts, the purchase money loan is paid off
first; anything left over is the debtor's equity, and this goes to the owner of the
security interest in after-acquired property. What would have happened if the
owner of the purchase money security interest had filed it within ten days and
received an absolute priority? The result would be exactly the same!
Id. at 44 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
185. See RAY D. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED 'TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 5-3, at 129 n.36 (2d ed. 1979).
186. See International Harvester, 296 So. 2d at 34-35.
187. Id. at34.
188. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (1998) ("Each provision of this Article with regard to rights,
obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the
debtor."); see also id. § 1-201(37) (''The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods
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Can the ·court's reasoning be defended? No, but it can be
explained. As the discussion below shows, the opinion has its roots in
pre-Code law when the purchase money interest was even more
favored by courts and legislatures than it is today. The result of
International Harvester was to expand the purchase money priority
significantly, in effect, restoring it to its pre-Code vigor.
As early as 1631, in Nash v. Preston, the English courts adopted
the basic proposition that a purchase money lien is something special
and should prevail over antecedent claims against the debtor or his
property. 189 At that time, however, the priority of the lien was subject
to significant limitations. Initially, its recognition was restricted to the
field of real property, and it was used only to protect the purchase
money creditor against such competing claimants as judgment
creditors and those who asserted claims of dower, courtesy, and
community property.190 To explain this special priority, courts used the
doctrine of transitory or instantaneous seisin: ''The idea is that title
shot into the grantee and out of him again into the purchase money
mortgagee so fleetingly-quasi uno flattu, in one breath, as it were-that no other interest had time to fasten itself to it."191
Rationalized in this way, it was unclear whether a lender who had
merely provided the debtor with the necessary funds to make the
purchase was also entitled to claim purchase money status. Other
issues, such as the priority of the purchase money security interest over
a creditor with an interest in after-acquired property, were also left
unexplored. Thus, as American courts began to develop an indigenous
law of security interests in personal property security, they had a
modest and somewhat incomplete background against which to
build. 192
With few exceptions, there was no need for American courts in
the early part of the nineteenth century to decide the type of issue that
confronted the court in International Harvester. Courts were not
concerned with this particular priority problem because the interest in
after-acquired property was long considered to be "merely equitable"
until the creditor was able to transform it into a legal interest by taking
notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is limited in effect to a
reservation of a 'security interest."'); id. § 2-401(1) ("Any retention or reservation by the
seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation ofa security interest.").
189. 79Eng.Rep. 767(K.B.1631).
190. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 743-48. The historical discussion in
the text relies in large measure on Gilmore's classic treatise.
191. GEORGEE. OSBORNE, HANDBOOKONTHELAWOFMORTGAGES 557-58 (1951).
192. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 743-48.
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possession of the property or by filing a supplemental mortgage. 193
While the after-acquired property interest remained equitable, the
priority of the purchase money lien was never questioned. It was not
until the United States Supreme Court decided a series of railroad
finance cases that the legal environment began to change.
The first significant case was Pennock v. Coe. 194 Responding to
the economic realities of the time and the special needs of railroad
finance, the Supreme Court approved the idea that railroad mortgages
should include after-acquired property. 195 It was satisfied ''that the
mortgage attached to the future acquisitions, as described in it, from
the time they crune into existence" and thus had a "superior equity''
over the claims of judgment creditors. 196 This decision encouraged
state courts to extend recognition to after-acquired property interests,
and even more venturesome state legislatures enacted statutes
validating after-acquired property clauses in railroad and public utility
mortgages. 197 Finally, the time was ripe for a contest between the
purchase money lien and the prior interest in after-acquired property.
The Supreme Court was given the opportunity to resolve this
issue in United States v. New Orleans Railroad.198 In this 1870 case,
two locomotives and ten cars (rolling stock) were subject to both
unrecorded security interests in the form of purchase money bonds and
the terms of an earlier recorded mortgage containing an after-acquired
property clause. 199 Justice Bradley wrote:
The appellants contend, in the next place, that the decision upon the
facts was erroneous; that the mortgages, being prior in date to the bond
given for the purchase-money of these locomotives and cars, and being
expressly made to include after-acquired property, attached to the
property as soon as it was purchased, and displaced any junior lien.
This, we apprehend, is an erroneous view of the doctrine by which
after-acquired property is made to serve the uses of a mortgage. That
193. See id.§ 28.1, at 746; see also Metropolitan Trust Co. v. R.R. Equip. Co., 108 F.
913 (6th Cir. 1901) (holding that title remained in the vendor until the purchase money lien
was paid fully, and that a mortgagee's interest was merely equitable); Southern Sur. Co. v.
Peoples State Bank, 163 N.E. 659 (Ill. App. Ct 1928) (holding that the validity of a lien
depends on the mortgagee's taking possession of the goods).
194. 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117 (1860).
195. See id. at 130. The Court observed that "[t]here are many cases in this country
confirming this doctrine, and which have led to the practice extensively of giving this sort of
security, especially in railroad and other similar great and important enterprises of the day."
Id.
196. Id. at 130-31.
197. See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 748.
198. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870). Gilmore refers to this case as a ''monument of our
jurisprudence." See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.1, at 745.
199. See New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 364-65.
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doctrine is IDtended to subserve the pmposes of justice, and not
IDjustice. Such an application of it as is sought by the appellants would
often result ID gross IDjustice. A mortgage IDtended to cover afteracquired property can only attach itself to such property ID the condition
ID which it comes IDto the mortgagor's hands. If that property is
already subject to mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does
not displace them, though they may be junior to it ID poIDt of time. It
only attaches to such IDterest as the mortgagor acquires; and if he
purchase[s] property and give[s] a mortgage for the purchase-money,
the deed which he receives and the mortgage which he gives are
regarded as one transaction, and no general lien impendillg over him,
whether ID the shape of a general mortgage, or judgment, or
recognizance, can displace such mortgage for purchase-money. And ID
such cases a failure to register the mortgage for purchase-money makes
no difference. It does not come withill the reason of the registry laws.
These laws are IDtended for the protection of subsequent, not prior,
purchasers and creditors.200

If all of this sounds familiar, it should. Justice Bradley's language
captures perfectly the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in
International Harvester.
After the New Orleans Railroad case, the breadth of the purchase
money priority continued to grow, spreading from railroad rolling
stock to other forms of property.201 The priority was not dependent
upon whether the purchase money creditor was a vendor who had
retained title to the property under a conditional sale arrangement, or
was a lender who had financed the purchase.202 Nor did it matter
whether the purchase money creditor had properly filed the agreement
or even whether the transaction was valid against third parties under
state law.203 The purchase money priority lien did, indeed, reign
supreme.
200. Id.
201. See 2 GIIMORE, supra note 180, § 28.3, at 753.
202. See id. § 28.2, at 749.
203. See id. § 28.2, at 748-49; see also Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914) (providing
relief to a purchase money creditor who failed to register); Myer v. Western Car Co., 102
U.S. 1 (1880) (deciding in favor of a purchase money creditor despite his failure to register);
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1879) (holding that a vendor's failure to register does not
defeat the priority of his lien because a mortgagee can take only the interest in property that a
mortgagor acquired); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. G.W. Parsons Co., 235 F. 114 (8th
Cir. 1916) (providing relief to a purchase money creditor despite the fact that the failure to
file made the lien invalid as to third parties under state law); Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux
City Cable Ry., 76 F. 658 (N.D. Iowa 1896) (holding that the vendor retained property despite
its failure to file in accordance with state statute). In instances where the after-acquired
property lienor could demonstrate that it actually advanced funds in reliance upon the
appearance of the debtor's unencumbered interest in the purchase money property, the result
was sometimes otherwise. See, e.g., Spencer v. Staines, 291 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1940) (holding
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The foregoing history of the purchase money lien was not lost on
the drafters of article 9. While the pre-Code bias in favor of purchase
money liens is continued, the drafters make clear in the official
comments to section 9-312 (if the black letter language of the section
were not clear enough) that the purchase money creditor must now
take certain perfection steps if she wishes to escape from the basic
first-in-time priority rule.204 Notwithstanding a statute that modernizes
personal property security law and achieves a sensible balance of
interests, the influence of pre-Code law was seemingly too strong for
the Florida court to overcome. It was not until the legislature
eventually stepped in and amended section 9-312 that the intellectual
habit of taught law was :finally broken.205

C.

Diefenbach v. Gomey

The discussion in this Part has already indicated that the idea of
title was not so easily dislodged from the realm of article 9,
notwithstanding the drafters' pronouncement in section 9-202 that
theories of title retention were not to interfere with the Code's explicit
allocation of rights, obligations, and remedies. Another part of the
Code in which the drafters sought to virtually abolish the concept of
''title" or ''property" is article 2.206 In pre-Code days, the concept
served as a jack-of-all-trades in sales law. One only had to decide who
had title, and then the answers would neatly follow to such diverse
questions as where the risk of loss lay, whether the seller could
maintain an action for the price, whether the buyer could replevy the
goods, and whether the seller's or buyer's creditors could levy on the
goods.2°7 But, for Karl Llewellyn, the neatness of such a singularity of
issue was not worth the price:
that a statute requiring filing was intended for the protection of creditors during the period
before filing); Mississippi Valley Trust Co., v. Cosmopolitan Club, Inc., 162 A. 396 (N.J. Ch.
1932) (holding that a mortgagee who advanced large sums while unaware of an untiled lien
of purchase money creditor was protected).
204. See U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt 4 (1998) (''Note that subsection (5) applies to cases of
purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set forth in
subsections (3) and (4).").
205. In 1978, the Florida Legislature amended section 9-312(4) by adding the
following sentence: ''Failure to so perfect shall cause the priority of said purchase money
security interest to be determined under subsection (5)." See 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-222
(codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 679.312 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999)). However, it
was not until 1986 that the Florida Supreme Court finally put International Harvester to rest
in ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. Regan, 481 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1986).
206. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-401 cmt 1 (1998).
207. See 1 STATEOFNEWYORK, REPoRrOFTHELAwREvlsroNCOMMISSIONFOR 1955:
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 445 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 NEW YORK
CoMMISSION REPoRr]; see also K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,
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The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of decision
as if the location of Title were determinable with certainty; and second,
with the insistence on reaching for a single lump to solve all or most of
the problems between seller and buyer-and even in regard to third
parties.2°8

Thus, when the drafting of the Code began, Llewellyn was
convinced that the time had come to scrap title as a means to resolve
sales controversies.
The unpredictability of application209 and
emptiness of rational content210 of title led Llewellyn to fear the effects
of enshrining the prominent role of title in the Code. As he saw it,
elimination of the doctrine was "one of the great clarifications that has
been offered to the law of these United States over many years."211
Making the most of their opportunity, Llewellyn and his crew of
drafters made the bold move of relegating title to backseat status in
article 2.212 In its place are specific rules premised on considerations
peculiar to the problem at hand.213 Gone is the one-issue-fits-all
approach of pre-Code law.
But the drafters did not completely ignore the concept of titie.
Section 2-401, for example, provides rules for determining who has
title, if that matters.214 The preamble to the section indicates the
limited relevance of the section's rules.215 The rules should be

15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159, 169 (1938) (calling the concept of title in the sales context "an
alien lump, undigested').
208. Llewellyn, supra note 207, at 166.
209. Llewellyn explained: ''Nobody ever saw a chattel's Title. Its location in Sales
cases is not discovered, but created, often ad hoc." Id. at 165.
210. Referring to the concept of title, Llewellyn fancifully wrote, ''when, in addition,
'the property' bounces around from party to party according to the issue, it begins to look as
if 'the property in the goods,' as an issue-determiner, were in the mercantile cases a farmer
far from the dell, and none too well adjusted to the new environment." K.N. Llewellyn,
Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725, 733 (1939).
211. 1954 NEW YORK CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 160.
212. The unimportance of the location of title is a theme the drafters thought worthy of
repetition. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-401 cmt. 1, 2-505 cmt. 1, 2-706 cmts. 3, 11 (1998).
Although most members of the academic community were pleased with the Code's
reformation of existing law, see, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial
Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 824-27 (1950); Elvin R. Latty, Sales
and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-8 (1951), there were
those who were not. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, The Law ofSales in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561-72, 588 (1950).
213. For example, the Code prescribes a separate set of rules on risk of loss, see
U.C.C. §§ 2-509 to -510 (1998), the buyer's right to replevin, see id. § 2-716, and the seller's
right to recover the purchase price, see id. § 2-709.
214. See id. § 2-401.
215. Seeid.
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consulted only if a Code "provision refers to such title"216 or when
"situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and
matters concerning title become material."217 The reference in the
official comment to the class of relevant title situations serves only to
remind one that title will no longer be used to solve sales problems. It
still may be necessary, however, to the application of various
regulatory statutes.218
It is surprising, but true, that notwithstanding Llewellyn's
celebrated effort to demolish the importance of title by showing its
tendency toward vacuity and by drafting rules to decide sales
controversies in terms of objective facts, not all courts were
immediately able to absorb the changes. Perhaps the area in which the
pre-Code preoccupation with title lingered the longest was risk of loss.
After all, when those who sat on the bench in the early days of the
Code received their legal training, the concept of title was, and for
generations had been, the vehicle used to allocate risk.219 For some,
the fact that article 2 abandoned this approach just did not seem to
matter.
For example, the court in Diefenbach v. Gorney was not merely
influenced by pre-Code law but actually decided the case on the basis
of that law, notwithstanding the Code.220 In Diefenbach, the seller was
a fanner who sold hay at auction with terms announced as "Cash
Before Removal."221 The buyer was the high bidder, but as it turned
out, he was short on cash.222 With only $500 in his pocket at the time,

216. Id. Several Code sections, typically oflittle importance, do contain a reference to
title. See id. § 2-312 (warranty of title); id. §§ 2-326(3), 2-327(1) (incidents of sale or return);
id. § 2-501(2) (seller's insurable interest in goods); id. § 2-722 (cause of action for injury to
goods). In addition, one important provision, section 2-403(1), pertaining to security of
purchase and good faith purchase rules, also references title.
217. Id. § 2-401.
218. The comments to section 2-401 provide:
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation
should be followed in cases where the applicability of ''public" regulation depends
upon a "sale" or upon location of ''title" without further definition. . . . It is
therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this Article
in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the
''private" law.
Id. cmt l; see, e.g., State v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Ala Civ. App.
1978) (using section 2-401 to decide a sales tax issue); Elliot v. State, 254 S.E.2d 900, 901
(Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (using section 2-401 to decide a criminal law issue).
219. For a discussion of pre-Code risk ofloss rules, see infra text accompanying notes
228-233.
220. 234 N.E.2d 813, 814 (Ill. App. Ct 1968).
221. See id.
222. Seeid.
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he was permitted to remove only $500 worth of hay.223 Some months
later, when the buyer returned to the seller's farm to pay for and take
possession of the remainder of the hay, he discovered that it was
gone.224 The seller, who was no longer living on the farm, had no
explanation
for
the
hay's
mysterious
disappearance.225
Notwithstanding his inability to deliver the hay, the seller sued and
received a judgment for the balance of the purchase price.226 Although
one could make the argument that this was a correct result under the
Code, it is not an exaggeration to say that, today, no one with even the
slightest exposure to article 2 would suggest that the court's reasoning
was correct. In a nutshell, the court's justification for its decision in
favor of the seller was as follows: "At a public auction, as soon as the
property is '!mocked down' to the bidder, the title to the property
passes to the bidder, subject however, to a lien on the property in favor
of the seller for the amount of the bid."227
Be that as it may, the court's reasoning rested on a presumption
of continuity with pre-Code law first announced in 1827 by the King's
Bench in the venerable case of Tarling v. Baxter.228 Indeed, the factual
and analytical similarities between Tarling and Diefenbach are
startling. Tarling, too, involved the sale of hay which was lost (it
burned) prior to the time it was paid for and delivered.229 The court
thought it "quite clear that the loss must fall upon him in whom the
property was vested at the time when it was destroyed by fire."230
Thus, the only question that had to be answered was where ''the
property'' was located. Since the contract referred to a specific stack of
hay, and the seller had nothing further to do, the court determined that
''the property'' passed to the buyer when the contract was made, even
though the buyer did not have possession and would not have even the
right to possession until the price was paid or tendered.231 It should be
noted that the decision in Tarling later served as the model for the risk
of loss rules contained in the British Sale of Goods Act,232 which, in
223. Seeid.
224. Seeid.
225. Seeid.
226. Seeid.
227. Id.
228. 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827).
229. See id. at 485.
230. Id. at486.
231. Seeid.
232. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet, ch. 71, § 20 (Eng.) ("[W]hen the
property [in the goods] is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer's risk whether
delivery has been made or not"). Section 18 of the Act provides the following rule for
pinpointing the moment when the property in the goods passes to the buyer: ''Where there is
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tum, served as the model for the Uniform Sales Act that Professor
Williston drafted in 1906.233
Again, the Code rejects ''property'' or "title" as the test for
determining when risk of loss has passed. Instead, if the seller is in
possession of goods to be delivered to the buyer without shipment,
section 2-509(3) provides that ''the risk of loss passes to the buyer on
his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk
passes to buyer on tender of delivery."234 This radical change from
pre-Code law minimizes cases where the risk shifts to the buyer before
the seller has transferred possession and control of the goods.235
Implicit in the Code's approach is the assumption that before goods
change hands, the seller is the one who is more likely to be insured
against the loss.236 Although section 2-509(3) might have changed the
result in Diefenbach, the court never mentioned it.237 Interestingly, the

an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in
the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the
time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed." Id. § 18 rule 1.
233. See UNIF. SALES Acr § 22 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 487-88 (1992) (replicating section
20 of the English Sale of Goods Act verbatim); id. § 19 rule 1, 3B U.L.A. 485 (replicating
section 18, rule 1 of the English Sale of Goods Act).
234. u.c.c. § 2-509(3) (1998).
235. In the typical case, the seller, by any standard, will be a ''merchanf' and,
therefore, the risk remains on the seller until ''receipf' by the buyer. ''Receipf' requires
"physical possession" of the goods. See id. § 2-103{l)(c).
236. The official comments following section 2-509 explain:
The underlying theory of [the merchant rule of section 2-509(3)] is that a
merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues meanwhile
to control the goods and can be expected to insure his interest in them. The buyer,
on the other hand, has no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he
will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession.
Id. § 2-509 cmt 3.
237. See Diefenbach v. Gomey, 234 N.E.2d 813, 813-14 {Ill. App. Ct 1968). Whether
the application of section 2-509(3) would have been outcome determinative would depend
upon whether the seller was a "merchant" Section 2-104(1) defines merchant to mean:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attnouted
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intennediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2~104(1) (1998). The question of whether a farmer is a merchant in the context of
various Code provisions has haunted courts and commentators alike. Although the issue
usually arises and is discussed in the context of the statute of frauds, what a court would
decide in a risk ofloss situation when the "[f]armer appears in court outfitted in bib overalls
and cowboy boots that cast off a faint perfume of manure," is anyone's guess. Ingrid
Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn sAttempt to Achieve the
Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1176-78 (1985).
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one Code section that the court did discuss merely codified a
longstanding common-law rule.238
How does one explain the court's faulty reasoning and its
selective application of Code sections? Perhaps the court took over a
century of intellectual tradition and learning into account, implicitly if
not explicitly. This would account for the theme of nonreform in an
opinion grounded in the past. There is, indeed, good reason to believe
that Diefenbach is additional evidence that the independent claim of
taught law, and the problems it poses for the judicial enterprise, cannot
be so easily overcome.
It is always possible to spot failures by courts to apply the law
correctly if one looks hard enough and measures "failure" against
some normative standard of how cases should be decided. Indeed, it is
child's play to show that, when applying statutes, courts do not always
reach the results the drafters intended. But judicial decision making,
like any complex decision-making process, remains difficult to
explain. The idea that a judge's legal perspective is partially a
background of legal training and experience seems most compelling
with respect to cases decided soon after legal rules change. We have
seen that habits of thought may limit the effectiveness of the change
until new habits have had time to develop. Eventually, however,
legislative changes will be able to exert a meaningful influence on
even the most intellectually stubborn of judges. With this account of
the role that taught law plays in the decision-making process, together
with how intellectual habits are mediated by legal change, we can now
try to predict some of the effects that the CISG may have on the future
course of domestic law.

ill. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CISG TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOMESTIC LAW

The potential influence that the CISG might have on courts
cannot be fully understood apart from the role that decisional law
plays in the broader scheme of lawmaking. In their classic treatise on
the legal process, Professors Hart and Sacks raise the issues that would
have to be addressed:
How should courts conceive of their responsibility to keep this body of
[unwritten] law alive and growing? When can they properly say, ''the
decisional law is settled, and any new development or change must
238. According to the court, UCC section 2-328(3) continues the rule that an "auction
sale is complete when the property is knocked down to the bidder." Diefenbach, 234 N.E.2d
at 814.
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come from the legislature"? When are they obliged to say this? When,
on the other hand, do they abdicate responsibility if they do so?239
This Part does not purport to present a complete :functional analysis of
these issues. In particular, it is assumed that, once understood, there
will be general agreement that it would be appropriate for courts to
adjust the development of decisional law in reaction to the CISG in
certain respects. In addition, this Part takes no position on whether
these adjustments would be based on normatively persuasive
conceptions of"good" or ''better'' law. The discussion is confined to a
sampling of instances where continued application of the CISG might,
over time, modify present law by causing the formation of new habits
ofjudicial decision making.
More specifically, subpart A considers the extent to which the ·
CISG might encourage courts to expand the availability of specific
relie£ Subpart B discusses the seller's right of reclamation and the
possibility that courts might rationally choose to enlarge its scope.
Subpart C explains why it might be desirable to make the German
procedure ofNachfrist a part of domestic law.

A.

The Expanded Availability ofSpecific Relief

Few premises are recited so frequently, and so reflexively, as
"specific performance is an extraordinary remedy developed . . . to
provide relief when the· legal remedies of damages and restitution are
inadequate."240 This rule has its genesis in the centuries-old
jurisdictional conflict between the English common-law courts and the
courts of equity. The compromise that they eventually reached was
that the courts of equity would step in and assume jurisdiction only in
those cases where the aggrieved party could show that irreparable
injury would result if equitable relief were refused. For buyers of
goods, this meant that specific performance became the exception
rather than the rule.241 To see why this was so, one need only
understand that a central assumption of this jurisdictional division was
the homogeneity of goods. If the seller does not deliver the goods, the
239. HENRY M. HAR:r, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 341 (William N. Eslaidge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
240. CALAMARI&PERILLO, supra note 165, § 16-1, at 661.
241. Because specific performance in favor of sellers raises special concerns, this
discussion is limited to the buyer's right to specific performance. One particular concern
follows from the fact that the only difference between specific performance for the seller and
an action for the price (damages), see U.C.C. § 2-709 (1998), is that enforcement of the
former is by contempt For some, this may conjure up unacceptable visions of a debtor's
prison.
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buyer will, most often, be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. As a
result, the buyer's expectation interest is fully vindicated by a damage
award based on an imagined242 or actual substitute purchase.243 There
were, however, situations, sufficiently out of the ordinary, in which
protection of the buyer's expectation demanded that the remedy be the
right to obtain possession of the goods from the seller. Thus, where
the goods were unique or not otherwise readily available in the
marketplace, specific performance was granted.244
The outlines of specific performance remained unchanged until
1855 when the British Mercantile Law Commission was established to
reconcile the civil-law rules of Scotland and the common-law rules
found in the other countries comprising the United Kingdom.245 One
question the commission had to answer was whether it should
recommend ''the limited view of specific relief traditional to the
common law or the broad remedy of 'specific implement' under
Scotch civil."246 The Commission recommended the latter.
''We see no reason why a buyer of goods should not be entitled to
compel the seller to perform specifically his obligation to deliver them
in terms of the contract. . . . We recommend that on this subject the
laws of England and Ireland be assimilated to the law of Scotland."247

242. For example, one Code fonnula for measuring the buyer's damages is the
difference between the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (1998). The import of this remedy is that a market exists,
giving the buyer the opportunity to enter into substitute transactions. If the buyer is forced to
pay more than the contract price, the excess is recoverable from the seller. While in theory
this calculation should put the buyer in the position he would have occupied had the seller
perfonned, in practice it may not See Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts
Relating to the Sale ofGoods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article
Two, 73 YALEL.J. 199, 258-60 (1963).
243. A measure of damages more accurate than the speculative market price/contract
price fonnula is a calculation based on an actual substitute purchase. For example, UCC
section 2-712 pennits a buyer to "cover'' by buying elsewhere and to recover from the seller
the difference between the cover price and the contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1998).
244. No one would doubt that a careful study of pre-Code cases would yield
uniqueness as a major explanatory principle. See D.A. Norris, Annotation, Specific
Peiformance, or Injunction Against Breach, of Contract for Sale of Tangible Personal
Property, 152 A.L.R. 4, 22-25 (1944). '"The tenn 'unique' was used generally in the context
of heirlooms, works of art, antiques, or goods having a pretium affectionis-a special value
not measurable in dollars." Harold Greenberg, Specific Peiformance Under Section 2-716 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 321, 324 (1982).
245. See 1955 NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 207, at 575.
246. Id.
247. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Second Report Mercantile Law Comm'n, 354
PARL. PAPERS 10 (King & Son 1855)).
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The very next year this recommendation found its way into the
English Sale of Goods Act.248 By itself, the expansion of specific
performance in Great Britain probably would not have compelled
courts in the United States to liberalize the granting of the remedy.
However, the liberalization movement abroad profoundly influenced
Professor Williston when he sat down to draft the Uniform Sales Act.
With only a few minor variations, he copied section 68 directly from
section 52 of the British Sale of Goods Act.249 It read in part:
Where the seller bas broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained
goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks
fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree direct that
the contract shall be perfonned specifically, without giving the seller
the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages.250
Although this provision invited courts to reform specific performance
practice by expanding the number of cases in which the remedy would
be available, the invitation was refused. Courts continued to do what
they did before the Uniform Sales Act.251 This is not smprising; as
Part II of this Article has shown, legal tradition and training can
sometimes undercut statutory changes. The legal community had been
so well indoctrinated to search solely for uniqueness that even the
revolutionary language of the Uniform Sales Act fell on deaf ears.
The Code, not smprisingly, reserves specific performance for
those cases ''where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances."252 Ironically, however, this seemingly traditional
statement belies the drafters' true intent, which they inexplicably
decided to express in the comments. The drafters, apparently hoping
248. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet, ch. 71, § 52 (Eng.). Section 52 of
the Act provided:
In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods
the court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the plaintiff, by its judgment or
decree direct that the contract shall be perfonned specifically, without giving the
defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages.
Id.
249. See UNIF. SALES ACT§ 68 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 501 (1992).
250. Id. Williston hoped that section 68 would ''perhaps dispose courts to enlarge
somewhat the number of cases where specific perfonnance is allowed." 2 SAMUEL
WIWSI"ON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT CoMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT§ 601, at 1508 (2d ed. 1924).
251. Williston himself commented that the English Sale of Goods Act and section 68
had not been ''much relied on by the courts ... but they seem to afford a clear warrant for an
extension of previously existing rules." 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CoN1RACTS
§ 1419a, at 2525 n.37 (1920); see also 1955 NEW YORK CoMMJSSION REPORT, supra note
207, at 575 ("[D]ecisions have construed this language against a background of equity
practice to require a showing that the remedy at law be inadequate.").
252. u.c.c. § 2-716(1) (1998).
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to foster a liberalization of the remedy,253 offer in the comments an
expanded definition of uniqueness that takes into account ''the total
situation which characterizes the contract."254 fu addition, "relief may
also be granted 'in other proper circumstances' and inability to cover is
strong evidence of' other proper circumstances' ."255
While some commentators have noted an expansive post-Code
trend toward the granting of specific performance,256 the majority of
courts continue to couch their opinions in the traditional orthodoxy of
uniqueness or peculiarity.257 The fact remains, however, that those
courts which are now inclined to alter their traditional position on
specific performance are free to do so under the rubric "other proper
circumstances."258 But as the history above indicates, the influence of
traditional limits on this powerful remedy is formidable, and the
habitual patterns it has caused may be difficult to break. It may be that
those courts which remain reluctant to grant specific performance
except as an extraordinary remedy will continue to decide cases along
historical lines until the next event occurs in the evolutionary process
of liberalization. We can only speculate, but perhaps the next event
has already occurred.259
253. See id. § 2-716 cmt 1 ("[T]his Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than
some courts have shoWI1 in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale.").
254. Id. § 2-716 cmt 2.
255. Id. It should also be noted that the drafters dropped the Uniform Sales Act
requirement that the goods be specific or ascertained.
256. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 244, at 344 ("Examination of the cases decided
since enactment of the Code in the various states reveals a continuing evolutionary trend
toward liberalization of the availability of specific performance.").
257. For decisions denying specific performance, see Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d
1247, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1977) (cotton was not unique); Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co.,
33 B.R. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (furniture was not unique); and Pierce-Odom, Inc. v.
Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (mobile home was not unique). For
decisions granting specific performance, see Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp.
1354, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984) (yacht was unique); Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1335, 1335-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1974) (same); Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc.
v. D & H Mach. Consultants, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 579, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (machine was
unique); Belleville v. Davis, 498 P.2d 744, 748 (Or. 1972) (en bane) (one-half interest in taxi
was unique); and Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(Albert's Famous Mexican Hot Sauce was unique).
258. See, e.g., In re Bullet Jet Charter Inc., 177 B.R. 593, 599 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1995);
King Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Lane, 846 P.2d 550, 556-57 (Wash. Ct App. 1993).
259. Another liberalizing event may be in the offing. Revised article 2 may contain a
provision declaring that courts may enforce a clause in a contract providing for specific
performance. See U.C.C. § 2-716(a) (Interim Draft Nov. 1999). Considering the lack of
litigation that these clauses have engendered over the years (counting both Code and nonCode cases), one has to assume that they rarely find their way into contracts. One can
speculate that such a clause, despite being potentially advantageous to both parties, is rarely
used because courts by and large do not feel that the use of such clauses dispenses with the
need to establish the traditional prerequisites for specific relief. See, e.g., Snell v. Mitchell,
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Consistent with the civil-law notion that specific performance is
the aggrieved party's entitlement, article 46 of the CISG gi-ants the
disappointed buyer a broad right to compel the seller's performance as
originally agreed. Ifthe seller has not delivered the goods, the buyer is
entitled to this remedy provided she has not resorted to a remedy
inconsistent with an action to compel performance.260
There is, however, one major stumbling block facing a buyer
who happens to file suit in the United States. The common law/civil
law compromise found in article 28 allows the court to refrain from
ordering performance if it would not do so under its own domestic
law.261 The outcome may, therefore, ultimately depend on the choice
of forum. In the United States, for example, a court might withhold
the remedy in any case in which the buyer could readily purchase
replacement goods elsewhere.262 But it is important to understand that
while article 28 would not mandate specific performance in such a
situation, neither would it necessarily preclude it. A United States
court could presumably rely on article 7 and conclude that domestic
65 Me. 48, 50 (1876) ("Neither party to a contract can insist, as a matter of right, upon a
decree for its specific performance."); Manchester Dairy Sys., Inc. v. Hayward, 132 A. 12, 15
(N.H. 1926) ("[A]uthority, if any here, is to be found, not in the express stipulations for
equitable relief, but in the general principles limiting equitable jurisdiction."); see also
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRACTS § 359 cmt (1981) ("Because the availability of
equitable relief was historically viewed as a matter ofjurisdiction, the parties cannot vary by
agreement the requirement of inadequacy of damages, although a court may take appropriate
notice of facts recited in their contract"). In sum, the revision to article 2 would work a
revolution in theory.
260. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 46(1). "The buyer may require performance by the
seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with
this requirement" Id. It seems clear that a declaration by the buyer' that the contract is
avoided under article 49 is inconsistent with compelling delivery of the goods as contracted,
whereas a claim for damages is not. See id. art 45(2) ("The buyer is not deprived of any
right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies.").
If the seller has delivered nonconforming goods, efficiency concerns justify a somewhat
less liberal application of the specific performance remedy. Additional limitations on the
remedy are, therefore, found in article 46, subsections (2) and (3). Under subsection (2), the
buyer can demand substitute goods only if the nonconformity constitutes a fundamental
breach, and she may not demand that the seller repair the defect under subsection (3) if it
would be unreasonable in the circumstances. See id. art 46. In the event the buyer elects to
require the seller to deliver substitute goods, she is, of course, obligated to make restitution of
the unsatisfactory goods "substantially in the condition in which he received them." Id. art.
82(1).
261. See id. art. 28. Article 28 provides:

If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled
to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to
enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its
own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.
Id.
262. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1998).
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restrictions on specific performance should be loosened in the context
of CISG cases.263
What pertinence has this to the availability of specific
performance in purely domestic cases? It just may be that the
remedial scheme under the CISG will eventually have the effect of
changing the remedy of specific performance from a limited remedy to
a remedy more widely available. The process is dynamic in that
courts are likely to encounter more requests for the remedy as CISG
cases begin to proliferate.264 In tum, courts that favor expansion of the
remedy are likely to disregard domestic limitations, which they are
certainly free to do under article 28. In making these decisions, a new
remedial jurisprudence will slowly develop, and old habits of restraint
will be broken. Since the Code's "other proper circumstances"
language can be used to support a great deal of judicial discretion,
there would be no real statutory impediment to this change of attitude.
In this manner, section 2-716 can truly have the liberalizing effect that
Llewellyn and his drafting team intended.265
263. In an effort to achieve international unifonnity, the drafters of article 7 caution
courts against a parochial application of the Convention. "In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote
unifonnity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade." CISG,
supra note 18, art. 7(1). See generally Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts ofthe C/SG in
a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges
to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & CoM. 187 (1998) (exploring the
difficulties caused by the several different language versions of the CISG).
264. For two explanations of why there have been so few domestic cases decided
under the CISG and why that situation is not likely to continue, see V. Susanne Cook, C/SG:
From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & CoM. 343, 349-53 (1998), and John E.
Murray, Jr., The Neglect ofCJSG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365, 365-79 (1998).
It is not suggested here that specific performance will be the remedy of choice for most
disappointed buyers under the CISG. On the contrary, it would most often be more efficient
for a buyer who is able to procure substitute goods from some other party to do so and
recover any additional costs as damages. Although specific performance may never become
the natural remedy in the run-of-the-mill case, it seems reasonable to assume that, in the
aggregate, there will be considerably more requests for specific performance when the CISG
governs.
265. Consider, for example, the plight of the prepaying buyer who discovers that the
breaching seller is insolvent. Is such a buyer entitled to specific performance? Today, there
is case law that would support the availability of specific performance in such cases, see, e.g.,
Proyectos Electronicos, S.A. v. Alper, 37 B.R. 931, 933 (E.D. Pa 1983), but not all courts,
see, e.g., Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 B.R. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983), and
commentators, see, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of
Manufactured Goods: A Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CAL. L. REY. 281, 28687 (1964) (seeing little support for this theory in view of section 2-716's emphasis on
feasibility of replacement rather than commitment by the buyer), would agree. If the new
article 2 takes effect, this issue will no longer be of any real importance where consumer
goods have been identified to the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-502 (Interim Draft Nov. 1999)
(providing that a prepaying buyer has the right to recover consumer goods in which he has a
special property). It will, however, remain an issue of critical importance in consumer
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An Expanded Right ofReclamation

Any extended discussion of article 2 invariably will touch on the
subject of the buyer's insolvency.266 This is the case because even the
most scrupulous buyer will find it difficult to perform when insolvent,
and the seller likely will find that damages are not an adequate remedy.
This raises an important policy issue: what 8pecial rights, if any,
should be afforded the seller when the buyer's insolvency intervenes?
Historically, the seller was permitted to rescind the contract and
reclaim the goods if the delivery had been induced by the buyer's
:fraudulent misrepresentation of solvency or intention to pay.267
Indeed, some courts were even willing to infer fraud from the mere
fact that the buyer was hopelessly insolvent at the time she took
delivery in a credit transaction.268 In this situation, section 2-702
provides the modem reclamation remedy for credit sellers:269
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods
on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made
Within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency
has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months
before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as
provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's :fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of
solvency or of intent to pay.

situations when the goods have not yet been appropriated to the contract or acquired by the
seller and in nonconsumer sales. This is, therefore, one context in which buyers might
benefit from a new judicial attitude toward specific performance.
266. Under the Code, "[a] person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts
in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1998).
267. See Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The
Credit Sellers Right ofReclamation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 247, 254-61 (1996).
268. See id. at 259.
269. Apart from an explicit reclamation remedy for credit sellers, the Code also
contains an implicit reclamation remedy for the so-called cash seller. See generally
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNJFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE, PEB CoMMENTARY

No. 1: SECITON 2-507(2), in 3B U.L.A. 602, 602-05 (1992). This reclamation remedy may
be needed when, for example, the buyer gives the seller a check which is later dishonored
upon presentation. The remedy is said to be grounded in two sections. The first is section 2507, which provides, ''Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of
goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is
conditional upon his making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (1998). The second
section is 2-511. This section provides that "payment by check is conditional and is defeated
as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment." Id. § 2-511(3). The
discussion in the text, while focused specifically on the credit seller's reclamation remedy
under section 2-702, is equally applicable to the unpaid cash seller's reclamation remedy. For
purposes of this Article, both remedies raise identical issues of scope and the potential affect
of the CISG on each is similar.
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(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser
under this Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods
excludes all other remedies with respect to them.270

New here is the explicit statutory recognition that the credit seller
deserves some special protection even if granting that protection
means she is being preferred over the seller's other creditors.271 And
what flows from this recognition? Upon reading the section, one
cannot help but notice that the remedy it grants is subject to procedural
and substantive limitations that put it beyond the grasp of most sellers
who may wish to use it.272 Moreover, most courts have placed an
additional limitation on reclamation claims by requiring the seller to
identify the goods she wishes to reclaim as those delivered under the
Their reasoning is statutory and not particularly
contract.273
convincing-the reference in section 2-702(2) to ''the goods" must
mean the "goods" first mentioned in the subsection (i.e., the goods
actually received by the buyer).274
One consequence of this restrictive reading of section 2-702 is
that the seller is out of luck if the original goods have been

270. u.c.c. § 2-702(2)-(3) (1998).
271. There was no section in the Uniform Sales Act that addressed reclamation
directly. However, it did so indirectly in section 73 by preserving rules relating to fraud and
misrepresentation. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 73 (1906), 3B U.L.A. 503 (1992). Courts
understood this to mean that the pre-Act law of reclamation continued to apply. See Garvin,
supra note 267, at 262. Notice that section 2-702 does not require proof of fraud or
misrepresentation. It "takes as its base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit
by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore
is fraudulent as against the particular seller." U.C.C. § 2-702 cmt 2. Moreover, comment 3
leaves little doubt that reclamation "constitutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's
other creditors." Id. cmt 3.
272. See U.C.C. § 2-702. One author describes the chances of being able to clear the
technical hurdles of section 2-702 as "mission impossible." See Brian N. Siegal,
Reclamation from an Insolvent Vendee-Mission Impossible?, 9 UCC L.J. 27, 43 (1976). It
is not just compliance with the technical requirements of the section that the seller has to
worry about; she must also be concerned about her priority vis-a-vis third parties who also
claim an interest in the goods. The list of possible third-party claimants includes a purchaser
from the buyer, a secured creditor of the buyer, a judgment creditor of the buyer, and the
buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. This Article is not concerned with these priority conflicts;
rather, its only concern is whether the seller has a reclamation right as against the buyer.
Without such a right, third-party claims are irrelevant.
273. See, e.g., In re Mayer Pollock Steel Corp., 157 B.R. 952, 959 (Bankr. E.D. Pa
1993); In re Dynamic Techs. Corp., 106 B.R. 994, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); Jn re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1987).
274. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 659. It is difficult to believe that the
statutory language is what dictates such a limitation when courts have reached the same
conclusion with regard to the scope of the remedy available to reclaiming cash sellers. See,
e.g., Jn re Samuels& Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
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transformed into goods of a different kind.275 As one commentator so
elegantly put it, "[a] seller of cattle may not reclaim rump roast."276
Notwithstanding the reason courts give for not permitting reclamation
in these cases, the age-old property law doctrine of specification may
be the key to understanding their reluctance. Specification occurs
when a new article (a "nova species'') is made out of one person's
chattel through the skill and labor of another, as when A's leather is
made into shoes by B, or X's grapes are made into wine by Y.277 If the
specificator has succeeded in creating a new species of good, the
original owner's interest terminates; if not, the owner of the original
good retains title to the end product.278 Although the doctrine is easily
stated, its application often requires the skills of a metaphysician, for
the determination of whether a certain chemical transformation or
physical change has been sufficient to shift title to the specificator is
fact-specific and inherently subjective.279 Whatever its difficulties, the
275. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 658. Another consequence of even
more significance is that the seller has no rights to the identifiable proceeds of the sale of
those goods. See, e.g., In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1984); Samuels,
526 F.2d at 1245; In re Diversified Food Serv. Distribs., Inc., 130 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Buyer's Club Mkts., Inc., 100 B.R. 37, 38 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re
Landy Beef Co., 30 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). Essentially, what this means for the
seller is that the reclamation remedy is valueless if the goods have been sold to a buyer in
ordinary course or there is a secured party who has an interest in the goods as after-acquired
collateral. To give the reclaiming seller a modicum of protection, one court allowed the seller
to recover the proceeds remaining after the claim of the priority secured party had been
satisfied. See United States v. Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (5th Cir. 1984). An
additional difficulty not present in cases where the goods have been transformed complicates
the question of whether the CISG is likely to have any effect on how courts treat proceeds
claims. See infra text accompanying note 294.
276. Garvin, supra note 267, at 276; see also Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 74 B.R. at 659-60
(holding a seller of coal is not permitted to reclaim coke); Landy Beef Co., 30 B.R. at 21
(holding a seller of calves is not permitted to recover beet).
277. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPEIITY § 6.2, at 50-51
(Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). A related but conceptually distinct doctrine is that
of accession. Accession occurs when a lesser good, the accession, is united with a principal
good. As a result of this integration, title to the accession passes to the owner of the principal
good. See id. § 6.1, at 49-50. An important similarity between the specification and
accession doctrines is that both operate only when the end product cannot be divided. It is
for this reason that one party must receive title to the whole product This all-or-nothing
approach is a consequence of the fact that "[t]he policy of the law favors absolute ownership
in one when a partition is impossible, rather than a tenancy in common of undivided shares."
Kenneth B. Lane, Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 119, 123 (1936). Although the accession doctrine
may also influence courts in the application of section 2-702, the discussion in the text is
limited to specification because the reported cases are overwhelmingly specification-type
cases.
278. See BROWN, supra note 277, § 6.2, at 50-51.
279. Compare Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala 590, 591-92 (1847) (wood transformed into
charcoal is the same species of good), Eaton v. Langley, 47 S.W. 123, 125-26 (Ark. 1898)
(timber transformed into cross ties is the same species of good), and Burris v. Johnson, 24
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point is that the doctrine is an all-or-nothing approach to title-one
party receives title to the whole good.
Pre-Code disputes involving secured parties may help to
illuminate how a court might, today, be influenced by the doctrine of
specification when applying section 2-702. It would seem that the
doctrine would be relevant in a wide variety of cases where work is
performed on collateral-for example, the manufacturing of an item
from materials subject to a lien. In such a situation, the question of
whether the secured party's interest will continue in the new product
and embrace the increased value derived from the labor of the debtor
would seem to require a specification analysis. Although not
explicitly using the term "specification," a number of courts faced with
such situations have used language indicating the need for the same
type of nova species inquiry used in specification cases not involving
liens.28° For example, the court in Netzog v. National Supply Co.
observed:
It is not to be doubted that a mortgage placed upon some one article,
will cover that article as subsequently changed, provided the integrity of
the article remains. Precisely as with a mortgage on a house and lot,
where the mortgage will remain a lien upon the house although painted
and improved durinfil the time of the existence of the mortgage and
before it foreclosed.2 1

Today, of course, courts would approach the matter differently in the
context of article 9 where there is a manifested intention to change old
habits.282 But because there is nothing in article 2 that would cause a
court to think differently about the doctrine of specification when a
seller seeks to reclaim, old habits remain unbroken.283
Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 196, 197-98 (1829) (timber transformed into a boat frame is the same
species of good), with Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh) 454, 467
(1829) (clay transformed into fired brick is a new species of good), and Potter v. Manire, 74
N.C. 36, 42 (1876) (timber transformed into a canoe is a new species of good).
280. See, e.g., Comins v. Newton, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 518, 518 (1865); Crosby v.
Baker, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 295, 298 (1863); Harding v. Coburn, 53 Mass. (12 Met) 333, 34243 (1847).
281. 28 Ohio C.C. Dec. 112 (1905).
282. See U.C.C. § 9-315 (1998).
This section changes the law in some jurisdictions where a security interest
in goods (e.g., raw materials) was lost when the goods lost their identity by being
commingled or processed. Under this section the security interest continues in the
resulting mass or product. ...
Id. § 9-315 cmt 2.
283. Not mentioned thus far is the problem of commingled goods. Specifically, is the
right to reclaim extinguished if the seller delivers fungible goods that are subsequently
commingled with similar goods from other sources in an identifiable mass? Most courts
have answered ''no" and have permitted the seller to reclaim a pro rata portion of the mass.
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Unlike the Code, the CISG does not specifically address the
seller's right to reclaim goods from the buyer. But this does not mean
that the right does not exist. Rather, it leaves the ability to reclaim, if
any, to be achieved through the catalogue of remedies provided for the
unpaid seller. The first step on the road to reclamation is for the seller
to declare the contract avoided under article 64(1).284 This she may do
if the buyer's breach is fundamental,285 or if the seller has provided
additional time for the buyer to pay or perform its other obligations
under article 63 (a Nachfrist notice), and the buyer did not do so within
that extra period, or the buyer otherwise notified the seller of her
intention not to comply.286 Once the contract has been avoided, the
seller will always have a right to restitution of the goods under article
81(2).287 Moreover, where the buyer has not paid the price, there are
no legal restrictions on the seller avoiding the contract even after the
buyer has held the goods for a substantial time.288 This alone
represents a significant departure from the remedial rights granted
unpaid sellers under the Code,289 but there is more. Article 84
supplements the seller's right of restitution by requiring that the buyer
"account to the seller for all benefits which he has derived from the
goods."290 Arguably, this permits the seller to extend the in rem right
See, e.g., In re Braniff, Inc., 113 B.R. 745, 753-54 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1990); In re WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 656, 660-61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1987); In re Charter Co., 54
B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1985). This is in keeping with pre-Code law. See, e.g., Clark
v. William Munroe Co., 86 N.W. 816, 817 (Mich. 1901). Moreover, article 2 explicitly
sanctions the sale of fungible goods. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (17), 2-105(4), 2-3 l 4(2)(b) (1998).
284. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 64(1 ).
285. See id. art. 64(l)(a). The important concept of fundamental breach is defined in
article 25. See supra note 90.
. 286. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 63. Essentially, the Nachfrist procedure enables the
aggrieved party to make the other party's failure to perfonn by a particular date the
equivalent of a fundamental breach. If failure to pay the purchase price when due is not itself
sufficient to create a fundamental breach, using a Nachfrist notice can make it so. For further
discussion ofNachfrist, see discussion infra Part III.C.
287. See CISG, supra note 18, art. 81(2) ("A party who has perfonned the contract
either wholly or in part may claim restitution from the other party of whatever the first party
has supplied or paid under the contract If both parties are bound to make restitution, they
must do so concurrently."). Again, it should be emphasized that this Article is concerned
only with the buyer/seller relationship. Because the CISG governs only the rights of parties
to the sales agreement, see id. art. 4, local law may defeat the seller's right to claim restitution
of the goods when certain third parties are involved.
288. A paid seller forfeits the right to avoid the contract unless she complies with the
specified time limits. See id. art. 64(2).
289. Professor John Honnold, who is unquestionably the leading commentator on the
CISG, observes that article 81(2) ''has implications that may be surprising to those schooled
in the common law." JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR lNTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
nm 1980 UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION § 444, at 562 (2d ed. 1991).
290. CISG, supra note 18, art. 84(2).
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of restitution into the proceeds resulting from the sale or other
disposition of the original goods or the product resulting from its
processing.291 In short, the seller's right of avoidance under the CISG
produces a right of reclamation which is substantially broader and
more potent than its UCC counterpart.
There is no question that the :frequent application of the CISG can
change how courts read particular UCC provisions such as section 2702. Under the current version of the Code, the CISG holds out the
promise of encouraging courts to permit reclamation in various
situations not covered by 2-702 and reclamation of proceeds and
products.292 If and when revised article 2 takes effect, there may be
one complicating factor. In an earlier draft, the unofficial comments
following section 2-816 contain this statement: ''The right to reclaim
extends only to the goods involved and does not extend to any
291. To the extent that the buyer has created additional value by marketing the goods
or by using its equipment and labor to transform the goods, however, some adjustment might
be necessary. See HONNOLD, supra note 289, § 451.3, at 573 n.5 ("Presumably, the buyer
could deduct the cost of redisposition; a similar adjustment would be appropriate when the
goods have been processed.''); see also In re Performance Papers, Inc., 119 B.R. 127, 128-30
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that proceeds from the sale of goods by authorization of
bankruptcy court in excess of seller's invoice price go to the bankruptcy estate).
Article 84(2) may also impel courts in non-CISG cases to more freely permit plaintiffs
to recover damages measured by the gain realized by the party in breach rather than the
plaintiff's lost expectation. Professor Farnsworth offers the following example:
Suppose that you and I have made a contract under which I am to sell you a
widget for $100, cash on delivery. At the time we made the contract, I valued the
widget at $90 and you valued it at $110, so the contract seemed advantageous to
both of us. But instead of delivering the widget to you, I found another buyer
willing to pay $125 and sold it to that buyer, realizing $25 over our contract price.
Since you still valued the widget at $110, I offered you $10 out of that $25. Can
you recover $25 from me?
Since, according to conventional wisdom, my "mere" breach of contract is
not a ''wrong," you can recover only $10 and not $25. The $10 that I offered you
would put you in as good a position as you would have been in had the contract
been performed, since that amount, plus the $100 you have not paid me, equals the
value of the widget to you.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma ofthe Disgorgement Principle in
Breach ofContract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341-42 (1985) (footnote omitted).
292. Although section 2-702 provides the only route to reclamation for the buyer's
misrepresentations of solvency or of intent to pay, see U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1998), the Code is
silent on whether the seller can reclaim for other reasons based on the common law of the
state. At least one court has suggested that she can. See In re Metal Tech. Mfg., Inc., 27
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 701, 705 (D. Utah 1979). But see ROBERT J. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 165, at 498-500 (1970) (suggesting that the Code is the
exclusive source of remedies for sellers). Section 1-103 of the Code permits the application
of non-Code rules in a Code-covered case unless those rules have been supplanted by the
Code. Of course, the tricky question is whether the Code has supplanted the common-law or
equitable rule. For a critical discussion of the various tests used by courts and suggested by
commentators to answer this question, see Frisch, supra note 54.

1999]

INERTIA OF HABIT

553

proceeds of the goods."293 Assuming that this statement will be part of
the official comments, a court might have to break the habit of
following the comments before it can break the habit of not
recognizing a reclamation right to proceeds.294
C.

The Nachfrist Procedure

The final example of how the CISG might affect the
development of domestic law is rather different from those employed
above. Here, the focus is not so much on how application of the
Convention might cause courts to reverse prior decisions, but, rather,
on the possibility that particular CISG rules might give birth to new
principles.295
We have already seen that the article 25 definition of
":fundamental breach" is applicable to both buyers and sellers and is
one of the key concepts on which the remedial structure of the CISG is
built.296 In particular, the concept triggers the aggrieved party's right to
avoid the contract.297 Suppose that the seller or buyer fails to perform
293. U.C.C. § 2-816(b) cmt 5(ProposedFinalDraftMay1, 1999).
294. Interestingly, several commentators, including this author, have recently argued
that the former habit should be broken. See, e.g., Peter A. Akes & David Frisch,
Commenting on "Purpose" in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Omo ST. L.J. 419, 458
(1997) ("[11he comments are produced by a system that behaves quite differently from what
is widely assumed.''); Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin ofAmerican Law: Committee
Notes, Comments, and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REv. 993, 1007-15 (1995) (depicting the
comments as the product of special interest groups and arguing that, as such, they are not
worthy ofjudicial deference).
295. Other legal systems have long played an important role in the development of the
common law. Discussing the judge as legislator, Justice Cardozo noted:
Many of the gaps have been filled in the development of the common law
by borrowing from other systems. Whole titles in our jurisprudence have been
taken from the law of Rome. Some of the greatest of our judges-Mansfield in
England, Kent and Story here-were never weary of supporting their judgments
by citations from the Digest We should be traveling too far afield if we were to
attempt an estimate of the extent to which the law of Rome has modified the
common law either in England or with us. Authority it never had. The great
historic movement of the Reception did not touch the British Isles. Analogies have
been supplied. Lines of thought have been suggested. Wise solutions have been
offered for problems otherwise insoluble. None the less, the function of the
foreign system has been to advise rather than to command. It has not furnished a
new method. It has given the raw material to be utilized by methods already
considered-the methods of philosophy and history and sociology-in the
moulding of their products. It is only one compartment in the great reservoir of
social experience and truth and wisdom from which the judges of the common law
must draw their inspiration and their knowledge.
CARDOZO, supra note 123, at 123-24 (footnotes omitted).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
297. Although article 25 is merely defmitional, it is central to the application of other
articles of the CISG. See CISG, supra note 18, art 46 (buyer's right to the remedy of specific
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on the contract delivery or payment date. Can the aggrieved party
avoid the contract merely because the other party's performance is
late? If not, then the contract is still in force, and the aggrieved party
must sit back and await the other party's performance, with only a
claim for damages resulting from the delay. If, in contrast, an
avoidance right exists, then the aggrieved party has an immediate right
to declare the contract avoided and is free to enter into a substitute
transaction. Most commentators have taken the position that there is
no avoidance right, typically observing that a slight delay in
performance will not cause the detriment and substantial deprivation
necessary for the breach to be fundamental. 298 At some point,
however, the delay in performance will become sufficiently substantial
to constitute a fundamental breach. The problem for the aggrieved
party is that she has no certain way of knowing exactly when that point
has been reached. There is always the risk that the court may later
decide that the attempted avoidance was improper because the seller's
failure to deliver or the buyer's failure to pay was not yet sufficiently
serious to warrant so severe a remedy. If the aggrieved party jumps
the gun and declares the contract avoided before the breach has
ripened into a fundamental breach, then she will have repudiated the
contract and will discover, much to her chagrin, that she, too, is in
breach.299

performance); id. art. 49 (avoidance by the buyer); id. art. 51(2) (avoidance by the buyer
when the seller has delivered only part of the goods or only part of the goods is
nonconfonning); id. art. 64 (avoidance by the seller); id. art. 70 (relationship of fundamental
breach and risk ofloss); id. art. 72 (avoidance for anticipatory breach); id. art. 73 (avoidance
in the case of an installment contract).
298. See, e.g., Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979),
reprinted in JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HisroRY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES 404 (1989). ''This Convention specifically rejects the idea that in a
commercial contract for the international sale of goods the buyer may, as a general rule, avoid
the contract merely because the contract delivery date has passed and the seller has not as yet
delivered the goods." Id., reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HlsTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES, supra, at 429.
It may be questioned, however, how often the buyer's failure to pay the price, take
delivery of the goods or perform any of his other obligations under the contract and
this Convention would immediately constitute a fundamental breach of contract if
they were not performed on the date they were due.
Id., reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES,
supra, at 429.
299. See infra notes 309-316 and accompanying text The anxiety that this situation
creates is comparable to that suffered by a party who is forced to guess whether the other
party's expression of inability or unwillingness to perform constitutes anticipatory
repudiation.
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The CISG's answer to the aggrieved party's dilemma is the
German procedure of "Nachfrisf' in articles 47 and 63.300 The
aggrieved party is permitted to "fix an additional period of time of
reasonable length for performance" by the breaching party.301 If the
goods are not delivered or the price not paid by the Nachfrist deadline,
or if the breaching party declares that she will not perform as
demanded, the aggrieved party can avoid the contract without concern
for whether the breach was actually :fundamental.302 The Nachfrist
procedure, therefore, enables either party to make time of the essence
where the contract itself is silent, and to eliminate uncertainty whether
the delay amounts to a fundamental breach.
What relevance does this have to domestic law? Many disputes
in contemporary contract law involve the right of the aggrieved party
to terminate the contract and sue for total breach. In these
circumstances, the Second Restatement of Contracts articulates what
has been described as a "sensible two-step analysis."303 The first step
is to ascertain whether or not a breach is material. If it is, the
aggrieved party is permitted to suspend performance.304
The
determination of whether a breach is material must be made in the
light of the contract circumstances of each case, including the extent to
which the breach will deprive the aggrieved party of what she is

300. See CISG, supra note 18, arts. 47, 63. Section 326 of the Gennan Civil Code
provides in part:
(1) If, in the case of a mutual contract, one party is in default in
performing, the other party may give him a reasonable period within which to
perform his part with a declaration that he will refuse to accept the performance
after the expiration of the period. After the expiration of the period he is entitled to
demand compensation for non-performance, or to withdraw from the contract, if
the performance has not been made in due time; the claim for performance is
barred.
§ 326(1) BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (F.R.G.), translated in THE GERMAN Crvrr. CoDE 53
(Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975).
301. CISG, supra note 18, art. 47(1) (buyer's Nachfrist right); id. art. 63(1) (seller's
Nachfrist right).
302. See id. art. 49{l)(b). While the Nachfrist procedure applies to all of the buyer's
and seller's obligations, it is a predicate for avoidance only if the seller has not delivered, see
id., or the buyer has failed to pay the price or take delivery of the goods. See id. art. 64(l)(b).
The procedure would, therefore, serve no useful purpose when used with respect to
contractual duties other than the foregoing.
303. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 8.15, at633 {2d ed. 1990). Of course,
this is not necessarily an unbiased opinion, coming as it does from the reporter for the project
As will soon be apparent, if the contract is covered by the Code, the consequences of a
breach may be significantly different from those that follow from the breach of a non-Code
contract See infra notes 304-313 and accompanying text For the sake of clarity, the
discussion is, therefore, limited at this point to the latter type of contract
304. See REsrATEMENT(SECOND) OFCoNTRACTS § 237 (1981).
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entitled to expect under the contract.305 The second step in the analysis
occurs when the aggrieved party makes the decision to terminate the
contract. Under the terminology of the Second Restatement, the
breach must be ''total" to warrant this response.306 The difficulties
mount because not every material breach is automatically a total
breach. This is true in those instances in which the breaching party
can cure the breach by remedying the deficiency in performance.307
As the comment to section 242 of the Second Restatement plainly
states, the party in breach must ordinarily be afforded some
opportunity to cure before termination is justified.308 How long is the
period of time between suspension and termination? Here, again,
there is no simple test to apply, and the aggrieved party who
announces that the contract is at an end does so at her peril.309
The aggrieved party's rights when there has been a delay in the
other party's performance have historically been troublesome, and are
troublesome still. Cases in which the contract states that ''time is of
the essence" pose relatively few problems; unless there is some reason
to question whether this phrase accurately reflects the intention of the
parties, any delay will constitute a material and total breach.310 In

305. A list of significant circumstances can be found in section 241 of the Second
Restatement. See id. § 241. ·
306. See id. §§ 236-243.
307. See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured
material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.").
See generally William H. Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code, 70
MINN. L. REv. 713 (1986) (comparing common-law and UCC treatments of cure).
308. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNrRAcrs § 242 cmt. a ("Ordinarily there is
some period of time between suspension and discharge, and during this period a party may
cure his failure."); see also Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material
Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 553, 594 (stating that the Second Restatement "attempt[s] to
lessen the impact of the material breach doctrine" by providing that the aggrieved party may
only suspend her ''Performance until it is too late for the breaching party to cure the default'').
309. The point is made by Professor Farnsworth, who explains that if the aggrieved
party "acts precipitously and terminates before it is entitled to do so loses its defense, as well
as its claim for damages for total breach, and will itself be liable for damages for total
breach." FARNSWORTH, supra note 303, § 8.18, at 643; see also Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81
N.W.2d 352, 355 (Mich. 1957) (stating that the decision to suspend and terminate "is fraught
with peril, for should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm of its
contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will have been guilty of material
breach and himself have become the aggressor, not an innocent victim"). Whether the
material breach has ripened into a total breach depends on circumstances similar to those that
are relevant to the materiality of the breach in the first place. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACTS § 242.
310. This is the position accepted by the Second Restatement:
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contrast, if the contract is silent and is not for the sale of goods, courts
have routinely concluded that time is not of the essence.311 Thus, there
can be no termination without giving the breaching party a chance to
cure. The problem for the aggrieved party is obvious; how much
delay must she tolerate before she is free to look elsewhere for
performance?
We can approach this problem by looking at an illustration drawn
from the Second Restatement:
A contracts to build a house for B for $50,000, progress payments to be
made monthly in an amount equal to 85% of the price of the work
performed during the preceding month, the balance to be paid on the
architect's certificate of satisfactory completion of the house. Without
justification B fails to make a $5,000 progress payment. A thereupon
stops work on the house and a week goes by. A's failure to continue the
work is not a breach and B has no claim against A. B's failure to make
the progress payment is an uncured material failure of performance
which operates as the non-occurrence of a condition of A's remaining
duties of performance under the exchange. If B offers to make the
delayed payment and in all the circumstances it is not too late to cure
the material breach, A's duties to continue the work are not discharged.
A has a claim against B for damages for partial breach because of the
delay.312

Here, unfortunately, A has no sure way to know when she is free to
leave the job and employ her assets elsewhere. The Second
Restatement builds on this illustration with another:
B tenders the progress payment after a two-day delay along with
damages for the delay. A refuses to accept the payment and resume
work and notifies B that he cancels the contract. B's tender cured his
breach before A's remaining duties to render performance were
discharged, and B has a claim against A for total breach of contract,

It is, of course, open to the parties to make perfonnance or tender by a stated date a
condition by their agreement, in which event, absent excuse, delay beyond that
date results in discharge. Such stock phrases as ''time is of the essence" do not
necessarily have this effect, although ... they are to be considered along with other
circumstances in detennining the effect of delay.
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt d (citations omitted).
311. See, e.g., Kakalik v. Bernardo, 439 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Conn. 1981); Freeman v.
Boyce, 661 P.2d 702, 705-06 (Haw. 1983); Leavitt v. Fowler, 391 A.2d 876, 877-78 (N.H.
1978). Unless the contract is an installment contract, the Code permits cancellation if one
party's perfonnance is late. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1998) (allowing the buyer to reject the
goods if"the tender of delivery fail[s] in any respect to confonn to the contract''); id. § 2-711
(allowing the buyer to cancel following rejection); id. § 2-703 (allowing the seller to cancel if
the buyer fails to make payment when due).
312. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 illus. 1 (emphasis added).
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subject to a claim by A againstB for damages for partial breach because
of the delay.313

Just like that, the innocent victim has himself become the bad person
with responsibility for the more serious breach. How long should A
have waited? Five days? Ten days? There is simply no way to know.
Perhaps, then, our system should adopt a procedure like Nachfrist and
permit a party in the position of A to make time of the essence by
fixing an additional reasonable period of time after which she can
safely declare the contract avoided if the other party has not
performed. A procedure that encourages fixing such a deadline is
attractive, in that it should reduce the inefficiencies that result from the
·
uncertainty that plagues the present system.
One other useful context for the Nachfrist procedure bears
mention. Not all agreements contain a provision for the time of
performance. Suppose, for example, that in a contract for the sale of
goods the parties do not agree, expressly or impliedly, on the time for
delivery.314 In such cases, section 2-309(1) provides that the time for
delivery shall be a "reasonable time."315 What is a reasonable time?
There is no mechanical test to make this determination. The answer
will vary from case to case, depending on such factors as ''the nature
of goods to be delivered, the purpose for which they are to be used, the
extent of seller's knowledge of buyer's intentions, transportation
conditions, the nature of the market, and so on."316 The buyer must
thus wait for the seller's performance without ever being sure when
she has the right to cancel the contract because a reasonable time for
delivery has expired. The buyer's position would be strengthened if
she could rely on aNachfrist-type notice given to the seller.
In summary, the Nachfrist procedure can improve an aggrieved
party's ability to declare the contract canceled in the event of
nonperformance, especially in instances in which the contract does not
state that time is of the essence. Hence, it is reasonable to posit that
once this procedure has been duly tested by experience in international
sales, it will gradually creep into domestic commercial practice and its
use will actually be encouraged by courts.

313. Id. § 242 illus. 1 (emphasis added).
314. Nor is there an applicable usage of trade, course of performance, or course of
dealing that can be used to fix a delivery date.
315. See U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (1998).
316. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 180, § 3-5, at 89 (footnotes omitted).

1999]

N.

INERTIA OF HABIT

559

CONCLUSION

This Article uses the CISG to illustrate situations in which the
emerging international commercial code may play an important role in
the long-term development of purely domestic commercial law.
Although it has been accepted that international law has the potential
to help shape the law.on a domestic level, this phenomenon has only
been discussed in the context oflegislation.317 However, international
instruments may also exert an influence on the behavior of judges
greater than is commonly supposed. For it is surely the case that, in
creating a new legal environment for decision making, these
instruments are bound to mediate existing intellectual habits and
encourage experimentation and growth in cases without an
international character.318
How much of an influence the instruments exert, and whether the
judicial adoption of international perspectives can be squared with
other goals or norms of domestic commercial law, remains to be
explored. It is time to confront these issues directly so that legislators
can reach a rational consensus when deciding how to respond to
proposed international instruments. Once it is recognized that
international law reform efforts involve not just international
transactions, but domestic law, and, as a result, domestic transactions,
legislative decisions can be seen to alter the fabric of modem
commercial law, influencing an enormous range of substantive
outcomes in the process. Efforts to ensure a clear understanding of
this sort are among a wide range of steps designed to build a
:framework within which international law can develop and grow
without unexpectedly and inappropriately disturbing the domestic
legal system.

317. See, e.g., Boss, supra note 28.
318. The process of mediation works two ways. Not only are international
developments likely to color judicial perception of domestic law, but a judge's understanding
of domestic Jaw is likely to have a similar influence on her application of international Jaw.
Not surprisingly, this latter possibility has not gone unnoticed by commentators. See, e.g.,
HONNOLD, supra note 298, at I (stating that domestic tribunals ''will be subject to a natural
tendency to read the international rules in light of the legal ideas that have been imbedded at
the core of their intellectual formation").

